Some History on The Druze

An excerpt from, “Revisiting the Druze Politics in Palestine under British Colonial Rule” By Eduardo Wassim Aboultaif, Arab Studies Quarterly, 2018:

The Zionist narrative with respect to the Druze participation in the 1948 war is best expressed in Laila Parsons’ words. Parsons writes that during the war (1948), relations between Jews and Druze reached a point of critical mass whereby individual instances of Druze support for Jews and vice versa were sufficiently numerous that they came to be interpreted as representing the two communities as a whole. It is unclear how Parsons reached such a conclusion, considering the intensity of Druze participation in military activities against the Haganah, and the fact that only few Druze supported the Zionist camp: Labib Abu Rukn and Salih Khnaifes. Then comes Parsons’ adoption of the Israeli narrative about the battle of Shafa‘mr and how the Druze asked the Israelis to engage in a fake battle to preserve their face.Similarly, the deputy director of the Middle East Affairs Department in the Foreign Ministry, Ya‘cov Shim‘oni, wrote, “We had no military surprises in the Galilee thanks to a network of information gathering and to the conquest of Shafa‘mr which came as a result of good relations with the Druze and the organization of the operation within.” Parsons and Shim‘oni fail to recall that the Druze fought fiercely in Ramat Yohanan, Hushi, and Kasayer before withdrawing from Shafa‘mr. They also fail to mention the casualties in Shafa‘mr and the lack of proper equipment to fight the Haganah. Hence, it is hard to accept these narratives because the battle in Hushi and Kasayer proved for all how tough Druze soldiers could be. If the Druze battalion of Wahhab were losing its men due to attrition, lack of proper equipment, food, money, and reinforcements from the headquarters in Damascus, then this is a logistical shortage that should be blamed on the ASA and the states behind it. Also, the Zionist conquest in Shafa‘mr came as a result of the Druze defeat in Hushi and Kasayer, where the Druze managed to take and hold areas previously controlled by the Haganah for a short period despite the Druze logistical shortages in manpower and ammunition.

Parsons is not the only scholar who adopted a Zionist narrative. Benny Morris writes that the Druze (and Circassian) villagers nowhere resisted the Israelis. It is not clear how a historian can negate such a tremendous Druze effort to support the Palestinian cause. To put it in Makarem’s words, “the Druze have always been so attached to their land that it is traditional for them to die on their land rather than leave it,” and historical data support Makarem’s argument. In Druze history, the community has never opted for forced migration from their towns and villages, and this is why the Druze of Antioch were annihilated rather than expelled and the Druze of Aleppo suffered from Fatimid persecution from 1021 AD to 1028 AD. Later on, the Druze were used as the first line of defense by the Islamic empires against the Crusaders, and consequently, their towns and villages in the Garb region in today’s Aley district in Lebanon, were completely destroyed a couple of times and suffered heavily from the Crusaders. Nevertheless, the Druze did not migrate even though at one point the Crusaders managed to exterminate all Druze leaders, and only one was left alive. Another example of Druze persistence and attachment to their land in times of crisis is recent events in Syria, where the community has managed to adapt to a radical change in reality after al-Qaeda affiliated an-Nusra-controlled Druze villages in Aleppo and Idlib. Despite the hardship, the community has not migrated or left their hometowns. Only once did the Druze migrate and leave their places of origins, and that was during the internal struggle in Mount Lebanon between the Qaisi and Yamani factions.

It is important at this stage to revisit an important speech by Shakib Wahhab during the course of war in 1948. During the course of war, Wahhab told his men: “It is known to all that we have no Druze aims in this war but that we are merely professionals who receive salaries and who must fulfill any obligation bestowed upon them.” This speech illustrates the level of commitment of the Druze with respect to the Palestinian cause, something that was reflected in the intensity of their fighting and their sacrifice during the war. We have to relate this speech to an important fact that the leading Druze political families in the region rejected cooperation with Zionists and called for open struggle to defend Palestine: Majid Arslan whose brother Nuhad fought in Palestine, Kamal Joumblatt who asked the Lebanese President to send irregulars to fight in Palestine, Sultan al-Atrash who was the leading figure behind the Druze battalion and its 500 soldiers, Kamal Kanj Abou Saleh from the Golan, and last but not least, Sheikh Abou Youssef Amin Tarif who refused cooperation with Zionism (at least until the defeat of the five Arab armies in 1948).

An excerpt from, “Who Are the Druze?” By Nina Landfield Ostrovitz, World Affairs, Winter 1984:

One of the names frequently appearing in discussions and print on modern Middle Eastern politics is the Druze. Terms like “Shia”, “Sunni”, and “Maronite” have become familiar to readerships and audiences and can be assigned to convenient categories such as Moslem or Christian. The Druze, however, elude easy classification and remain something of an enigma to laypeople and professionals alike.

Any study or account of the Druze must include some discussion of their unique religion. Although a lengthy description is not within the scope of this article, a few words will suffice as to the nature of the religion and its effect and influence on its adherents.

The Druze religion, an offshoot of the Ismailiyya branch of Islam (which recognizes a particular branch of the Prophet Mohammed’s descendants as the true religious leaders of Islam), broke away from Islam in the eleventh century; it is a secret and esoteric sect. An outstanding feature of the Ismailiyya and the Druze faith is the concept of taqiyya or dissimulation, whereby a persecuted believer may hide his religion and even profess another faith. This concept of taqiyya, and the Druze ban on proselytizing and intermarriage, have made the Druze a close and tight-knit group which brooks little interference with its way of life. This cohesiveness and devotion makes them excellent guerrilla fighters. Independent and loyal first and foremost to their own amirs and shaykhs, they have often opposed the regimes under which they lived.

It is difficult to define the Druze as a minority. Taqiyya and nine centuries of existence have obscured the origins of the Druze. Various theories of dubious value have connected them with the Chinese, the Druids, and a lost Crusader army. These legends, and others, while of little use to the historian, do point out that the Druze were not considered true Arabs or Arab in origin. The religious and ethnic background of the Druze have often made their status in the Arab world and the pan-Arab movement somewhat controversial and sensitive.

The Druze are famous in the Middle East as warriors. Even in a region where militarism is rampant, they are noted for their courage and fierceness in battle. Religious fatalism adds to a seeming disregard for death.These traits, though, had never been utilized in expansion or proselytizing. Self-defense, protection of the Druze way of life, and revenge have been the only motives, until recently, that spurred their fighters. Contrasting their zeal in war and their lavish hospitality in peace, an bserver noted that the Druze make the best of friends and the worst of enemies.