Financing Better Public Parks in Indian Cities
by Anirudh Burman.
Why urban parks present a public-finance problem
Parks provide places to walk, play and meet, while their trees and open spaces offer benefits beyond those who visit them. Keeping parks accessible requires continuing expenditure on gardeners, cleaning, water, repairs and the replacement of worn-out facilities. Municipal budgets must meet these costs alongside other infrastructure needs. Charging visitors can raise money, but may discourage use and exclude residents who cannot afford to pay.
Indian cities have already sought support through park adoption, donated facilities and commercial uses. They also pay contractors and community organisations to undertake maintenance. These arrangements perform different financial functions. Outsourcing changes who delivers a publicly funded service; mobilising private finance brings additional contributions towards improvements or upkeep. A donated facility or permission to operate a kiosk, however, does not by itself ensure that money will be available for continuing care.
I argue that public finance should help mobilise private resources through commitments that contributors, park managers and public authorities can honour. Contributors need defined benefits and clarity about their obligations. Managers need dependable funding, sufficient continuity and authority to use the receipts on which their maintenance plans depend. Public authorities must preserve access and provide for parks with limited prospects of attracting donations or commercial income. The objective is to increase the resources available for accessible, well-maintained parks while retaining a dependable public commitment to their care.
The essay develops this argument through comparisons with New York and London’s Royal Parks and an examination of arrangements in Indian cities. It considers operating funding, tenure, donor benefits, revenue rights and public safeguards to explain how private contributions can support continuing maintenance. The comparison leads to principles for public finance suited to parks with different costs, donor bases and commercial opportunities.
Principles for a financing architecture
First, I consider the option of free access. The case for public expenditure is straightforward. General revenues can flatten costs and benefits across those who do and do not use parks directly. Where available money falls short of the cost of acceptable care, the authority must increase funding or reduce service standards.
The other usual option is ticketed entry. Charges can contribute to upkeep where visitors are willing and able to pay. However, charging for every visit may discourage regular use and exclude poorer residents, and also leave wider environmental benefits unpaid.
A third option is to combine public and private financing. The city can fund basic maintenance while donors/ licensees of services pay for improvements or contribute to annual upkeep. Companies can support eligible work through corporate social responsibility (CSR) programmes. A licensed cafe can pay fees towards maintenance where commercial demand permits. Public ownership and free entry can continue. The Delhi Urban Art Commission’s Park Design Guidelines already discusses such contributions and revenue sources.
This mix addresses the limits of the first two options. In Indian cities, public finances are often inadequate to fund park maintenance alongside competing infrastructure needs. Research on Chennai describes a municipal corporation with few internal resources and neglected parks in poorer neighbourhoods. Ticketing cannot reliably fill this gap. Affordable charges may raise too little, while higher charges exclude users and discourage visits. Where sufficient revenue depends on prices that residents cannot afford, ticketing is infeasible as the main source of maintenance funding.
A workable funding arrangement must meet two requirements. It must provide capital resources to rehabilitate a park and recurring resources to keep it in good condition. Capital resources pay for works such as repairing paths, installing toilets or replacing playground equipment.
Recurring resources must cover gardeners’ wages, cleaning, water, electricity and repairs, with provision for eventual replacement of worn-out assets. A donated toilet illustrates the distinction. Its construction may be fully financed, while there may not be any plan or provision for its cleaning, water supply and repairs. This is a general phenomenon observed in Indian city infrastructure in general, and also in parks.
New York and London’s Royal Parks illustrate how public payments, donations and commercial income can be combined to meet both requirements.
What New York and London demonstrate
The international and Indian cases were selected to show variation in financing arrangements and governance, not to represent all Indian parks or support a statistical comparison. The essay compares how these arrangements work on paper and in reported practice; it does not rank their performance.
New York
New York combines public ownership of parks with several forms of management. The city’s parks department, NYC Parks, provides services directly and contracts with nonprofit organisations for specified responsibilities. The mayor and budget office prepare spending plans, and the City Council approves public expenditure. Nonprofit boards manage their own staff, budgets, fundraising and investments. Commercial concessions require separate public approvals, including review by the city’s Franchise and Concession Review Committee where applicable. State law also protects parkland against diversion to non-park uses, generally requiring specific legislative authorisation. Delegating maintenance therefore leaves important decisions over money and land with public authorities.
The Central Park Conservancy which manages the Central Park is one such nonprofit. Formed in 1980, it developed from civic fundraising and restoration into a professional management organisation, with a formal city management agreement from 1998. It employs staff, maintains the park and plans improvements within its delegated role. The city retains ownership and regulatory authority. This continuing relationship enables the Conservancy to accept gifts and undertake obligations extending beyond individual restoration projects.
The city also pays the Conservancy for services. Termination is limited to specified contractual conditions. The Conservancy must raise and spend at least $16 million annually on specified services. In exchange, the city pays $16 million a year, reducible in proportion to cuts in the city’s operating budget. This payment sits alongside private fundraising and separate public capital projects. It gives the organisation a defined public contribution against which to plan, while leaving it exposed to fundraising risk.
Within this institution, donors can support memberships, commemorative benches and trees, restoration projects or endowments. Recognition, experiences and negotiated project naming offer different reasons to give without conferring ownership or exclusive possession. The money has different uses. Unrestricted gifts can pay salaries and cleaning bills. Restricted gifts have to be used for their agreed purpose. Endowments invest donated capital and provide distributions under spending rules accompanied by a plan for subsequent care. Organised fundraising connects donors to a manager able to explain those obligations and account for their money.
New York’s Bryant Park Corporation manages Bryant Park under city agreements, with concessions and business improvement district (BID) arrangements supplying revenue. Under New York’s BID framework, a district management nonprofit spends compulsory property assessments on local services under an approved plan. Property owners, tenants and public officials are represented on its board, and the city collects and transfers the assessments. This gives nearby beneficiaries a collective financing arrangement. The assessment is distinct from a voluntary gift or a levy calculated on measured land-value appreciation.
Concessions give operators permission to earn money from specified activities in exchange for contractual payments or services. Public approval determines the permissible use and the how the receipts are allocated. A park manager cannot assume that permission to host a cafe includes permission to retain its income. Bryant Park’s combination depends on commercial demand and the surrounding property economy.
These arrangements coexist with ordinary municipal maintenance. For neighbourhood parks, NYC Parks continues to provide core services, supplemented by local fundraising and volunteering. Partnerships for Parks, operated with City Parks Foundation, helps community groups organise, access grants and administer funds through fiscal sponsorship. Groups can therefore share administrative support without establishing a professional conservancy for every park.
London
London’s eight Royal Parks, including Hyde Park and Richmond Park, form a Crown estate under the central government’s Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS), separate from ordinary municipal parks. A 2016 contracting-out order allowed DCMS to delegate its statutory management functions. In 2017, the functions of the government parks agency and a separate fundraising foundation were combined in a charitable company, The Royal Parks Limited. DCMS granted it a ten-year management licence and service contract. The charity manages the estate but cannot sell the parks. The reform addressed restrictions that had prevented the agency from accumulating reserves and retaining surplus receipts across years. Combining management and fundraising with these financial powers allowed the charity to plan beyond the annual budget cycle.
DCMS holds the public management powers and permits the charity to retain park income. Trustees approve budgets, staffing, investment, reserves and commercial strategy within the licence and charitable obligations. The senior managers handle daily operations within delegated financial limits. The Mayor of London appoints some trustees and has adjacent planning responsibilities, but neither general ownership nor annual budget responsibility. Regulators oversee compliance and auditors examine the accounts, while operational decisions remain with the charity.
The charity’s wholly owned trading subsidiary conducts commercial activities and transfers available profits to the charity. Concession and event partners operate under approved contracts, park-use restrictions and relevant planning, conservation and safety requirements. Revenue retention allows the charity to keep authorised receipts and spend them on the parks. Carry-forward and reserves let it meet costs in later years. Managing the portfolio together also allows shared administration and planning across parks with different earning opportunities.
This structure supports a predominantly earned-income model. In 2024-25, trading activities generated about GBP 46.3 million, including events, catering concessions, property income, parking and filming. DCMS paid an GBP 11 million cash service fee, which did not meet the full cost of management. Donations and grants contributed about GBP 3 million. Other income included sporting and cultural activities. It supplied no cash for wages. Commercial receipts, philanthropy and the government payment therefore make different contributions to the operating budget.
The contract also allocates risk. The charity bears ordinary operating and asset-maintenance risk, while DCMS retains major asset-failure risk. Events income fell in 2024-25, showing why commercial receipts require a financial buffer. The trustees set general reserves at GBP 23 million, including GBP 15 million for working capital to meet current bills, while separately designating funds for restoration and maintenance projects.
This comparison explains five factors: operating funding, tenure, donor benefits, revenue rights and public safeguards. New York’s contracts and district arrangements, and London’s licence and delegated powers, identify governance and accountability structures allowing for autonomy and diversification. They allow park managing organisations to hire staff, seek gifts and manage receipts while government retains control over public assets. Exceptional donor wealth, property values and visitor demand limit their transferability.
Indian cities already use multiple financing arrangements
Indian cities have also tried to combine public expenditure with community participation, donated facilities and commercial activity. The public bodies responsible for these arrangements differ across cities and sometimes within the same city. Their control over land, maintenance budgets and permissions determines what they can offer a contributor. The existing arrangements show both how public money supports delegated maintenance and how cities seek additional private resources.
Delhi
Delhi has separate arrangements for parks controlled by the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) and the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD). DDA owns the parks offered for adoption, and its horticulture officers sign the agreements and supervise the adopters. MCD maintains municipal parks through its horticulture department and other service providers. A third institution, the Delhi Parks and Gardens Society (DPGS), administers government grants to residents’ welfare associations (RWAs) and nongovernmental organisations. A community group using a DPGS grant spends public money, whereas a DDA adopter finances the agreed work from its own resources.
DPGS provides separate grants for routine maintenance, new parks and decentralised sewage-treatment plants. The application process requires permission from the land-owning agency, a tripartite agreement, inspections and utilisation certificates documenting expenditure. Residents organise the work using public grant money. Additional contributions from residents supplement that public funding.
MCD’s Standing Committee approved the revival of its stalled RWA scheme in February 2026. The revival followed an earlier interruption and reports of unpaid dues. Under the scheme, the commissioner must approve each adoption, and horticulture staff are responsible for monitoring the work. Under the reported terms, MCD would pay RWAs INR 13,500 per acre each month for gardening, irrigation, mowing and cleaning. MCD retains responsibility for existing lights, gyms, shelters and play equipment. RWAs cannot undertake permanent construction or commercial activities. The arrangement separates routine care from municipal infrastructure obligations, without giving associations a commercial income stream.
DDA’s adoption policy (2020), instead, requires adopters to meet the full cost of agreed improvements and maintenance. Adopters can upgrade and maintain a park, maintain an existing park or part of one, or install and maintain a facility. DDA approves improvements and retains control over the park, while adopters must preserve public access, meet prescribed maintenance standards and submit to inspection. The initial three-year term can be renewed with DDA approval in three-year periods up to twelve years, subject to the park remaining under DDA. DDA permits acknowledgement signs and approved public events for up to twenty days a year. The policy contemplates temporary kiosks but does not automatically entitle adopters to retain the receipts. Installed assets vest in DDA when the arrangement ends.
Mumbai
For Mumbai’s municipal parks, the Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation (BMC) provides funding through its Garden Department and procures maintenance through ward-level contracts. BMC’s 2025-26 budget proposed INR 220.12 crore for the department as a whole. The budget also recorded an invitation for volunteer agencies to participate in the proposed Mumbai Public Park without a financial commitment from BMC. The volunteer invitation sought contributions from outside the municipal budget.
BMC has also experimented with adoption and caretaker arrangements. However, this move was derailed due to objections. Public controversy centred on the mingling of private facilities, possession of parkland by the adopters and caretakers, and restrictions on access. A February 2024 report described BMC’s withdrawal of a draft offering longer adoption terms after public objections. This history helps explain why the permissions offered to private participants have remained contested.
Kolkata
The Kolkata Municipal Corporation (KMC) provides municipal park services through its Parks and Squares Department. KMC’s budget combines parks, squares and urban forestation in one expenditure head. The corporation’s published account of its park services identifies maintenance by a private horticultural company at Citizen’s Park, or Mohar Kunja.
Commercial use has also occurred without a clear connection to maintenance funding. A report on Vivekananda Park described rentals by clubs, damaged paths, waste and restrictions on public use. It is unclear whther rental receipts accrued to the KMC or paid for upkeep. The Vivekananda Park example illustrates why permission to use public space, revenue collection and maintenance responsibility must be identified separately.
Bengaluru
Responsibility for Bengaluru’s parks is divided among the municipal government, the Bangalore Development Authority (BDA) and the state Horticulture Department. The Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike (BBMP) published a 2024 community-involvement policy for parks under municipal custody. The policy excludes Lalbagh, Cubbon Park and BDA parks. BBMP’s 2024-25 performance report records contracted maintenance and Hasiru Mitra inspections, alongside separate provision for upgrades, fencing and new parks.
Under the community policy, companies, RWAs and other contributors can provide facilities and services such as benches, toilets, drinking water, cleaning and security. Contributors must obtain approval and enter into an agreement with BBMP. The municipality retains custody of the parks and supervises the work, while completed assets vest in the city. The policy specifies an eleven-month term and prohibits the direct acceptance of cash under this arrangement. BBMP separately reported 48 adopted parks and medians but did not report the value of adopters’ contributions. Formal commencement of the policy and its application after municipal reorganisation remain unconfirmed. The published terms cannot therefore be assumed to govern all reported adoptions.
Chennai
The Greater Chennai Corporation (GCC) organises municipal park maintenance through its own labour force, contractors and adopters. Its City Action Plan records a snapshot of 702 parks: 76 maintained by GCC labour, 533 outsourced and 93 adopted. GCC pays contractors to undertake maintenance, while adoption can bring contributions from outside the municipal budget. These routes coexist within the corporation’s portfolio, with different sources of funding and obligations.
GCC’s 2023 proposals to improve contractor accountability included smaller maintenance packages and a payment structure with 75 per cent fixed and 25 per cent linked to inspections. A tender reported in December 2024 proposed a INR 46 crore maintenance package covering 595 parks over three years, with digital work logs, biometric attendance and user feedback. The proposals were intended to make work observable and connect public payments to contractors’ performance. The tender and proposals do not establish whether monitoring subsequently produced deductions or better maintenance.
The Indian cases show that public agencies already use maintenance contracts, community grants and adoption to organise park care. Contracting and community grants rely on public funds, while adoption can require contributors to pay for both improvements and upkeep. Commercial use of park space raises separate questions about who receives the income and whether the receipts fund maintenance. Mumbai’s caretaker disputes also show how private facilities and possession can create the perception, real or imagined, of threatenening public access. The next section compares Indian arrangements with those in New York and London on five grounds: operating funding, tenure, donor benefits, revenue rights and public safeguards. The comparison examines who can commit public funding, grant revenue rights and enforce maintenance and access obligations.
The successes and constraints of the current arrangements
New York and London show how public support can combine with other income to sustain park management. Central Park pairs city payments with organised fundraising. The Royal Parks charity receives a government payment and retains commercial income. Indian cities also use public contracts, community grants, adoption and contributed facilities. Accountability, clear service objectives and autonomy over authorised spending are relevant institutional conditions. Funding instruments, including maintenance contracts, adoption agreements, gifts and concessions, specify who contributes, what they receive and which obligations they assume. Day-to-day practices determine whether those commitments are fulfilled. A maintenance contract depends on timely payment and credible inspection; an adoption agreement depends on clear maintenance duties and follow-through when work falls short.
The five criteria follow from the need to finance both improvements and recurring maintenance while preserving public access. Operating funding identifies who pays wages, utilities and repairs, and who bears a shortfall. Tenure matters because the duration and renewal conditions affect whether a contributor can plan for the medium to long-term. A capital improvement may last much longer than the agreement under which it was installed.
Donor benefits matter because a contributor may value recognition, experiences or improvements to a public amenity. Revenue rights establish whether the park manager may collect, retain and spend income from permitted activities. A donor’s willingness to give and an operator’s ability to earn money require different arrangements. Public safeguards concern the controls needed to protect access, verify maintenance and recover control after a breach. The criteria therefore test whether the promised resources and rights can support continuing care while protecting the park’s public use.
Table 1. Park financing and management: Central Park, the Royal Parks and DDA adoption
| Dimension | Central Park | DDA adoption | Royal Parks: authority |
|---|---|---|---|
| Operating funding | City service payments alongside Conservancy fundraising. | Adopter bears development and maintenance costs under the policy. | DCMS pays a cash service fee; trustees budget retained income. |
| Tenure | 2023-2033 management agreement; further renewal requires agreement. | Three years, renewable in three-year terms up to twelve, subject to DDA jurisdiction. | DCMS licence began in March 2017 for ten years; later terms require confirmation. |
| Donor benefits | Recognition, experiences, memorials and negotiated project naming. | Specified acknowledgement signs and conditional public-event permissions. | Trustees manage fundraising within charitable and licence obligations. |
| Revenue rights | Concession income follows separate authorisations and agreements. | Kiosk permission supplies no automatic right to retain proceeds. | DCMS permits retention; trustees decide expenditure within the permitted purposes. |
| Public safeguards | City ownership, public approvals and contractual service duties. | DDA retains control, requires public access and provides termination and asset handback. | Government retains public powers; managers implement use restrictions; regulators and auditors oversee compliance. |
Central Park: 2024 audited disclosures and published donor arrangements. DDA: policy amended October 2020, not an evaluation of executed adoptions. Royal Parks: 2024-25 accounts and published governance disclosures.
Operating funding
Central Park’s management agreement gives the park Conservancy a public service payment alongside its fundraising obligations. In contrast, DDA’s adoption policy places the agreed improvement and maintenance costs on the adopter, without a comparable public payment. Both arrangements delegate work, but the adopter under DDA must secure funding for that work. The Royal Parks charity combines retained income with a government service fee. The charity bears ordinary maintenance risk, while DCMS retains major asset-failure risk. The allocation of costs therefore matters as much as the range of funding sources.
MCD’s RWA scheme and Chennai’s maintenance contracts involve public payment for services. Their financial credibility depends on whether the authority pays on time. MCD’s earlier interruption of the RWA scheme documents this risk. Chennai’s inspection-linked payment proposals address the other side of the contract: whether the supplier earns payment by delivering the required work. Both of these are however better described as outsourcing contracts rather than mobilising private revenues for supplementing private ones.
Tenure
The Central Park Conservancy and the Royal Parks charity both manage publicly owned parks under ten-year agreements. Central Park’s agreement runs from 2023 to 2033. The Royal Parks charity received its ten-year licence in 2017; the available accounts leave its post-2027 terms unconfirmed. In both cases, the agreement gives the manager a period over which to organise staff, fundraising and maintenance, subject to contractual duties and public oversight.
DDA offers an initial three-year adoption, renewable in three-year periods up to twelve years while the park remains under its jurisdiction. Continuing for the full period therefore requires successive approvals. DDA can also terminate an adoption through the prescribed procedure, and installed assets vest in the authority on termination or expiry. BBMP’s published text specifies an eleven-month term, although its implementation status remains unverified.
The difference concerns the period for which a contributor can rely on an agreed role. DDA’s three-year renewal cycle requires more frequent decisions about continuation than the ten-year agreements used for Central Park and the Royal Parks. If a donor funds a facility whose upkeep extends beyond the current term, the donor and public authority must agree who will provide that care after expiry. Renewal conditions can protect the public against poor performance, but uncertainty about continuation can complicate long-term commitments.
Donor benefits
Central Park and the Royal Parks both offer donors recognition without transferring ownership or exclusive use of park facilities. Their bench programmes make the offer concrete through published donation amounts and dedication conditions. Central Park also offers memberships, tree memorials and negotiated project recognition. The Royal Parks’ bench dedications depend on location, availability and approved inscriptions. The shared feature is a defined offer administered by the organisation responsible for the park, although the range of benefits differs.
DDA already offers acknowledgement signs and approved public-event permissions. BBMP’s published policy also provides a route for contributors to supply facilities and services. However, a prospective donor may still need a specific offer linking the contribution sought, the duration of recognition and responsibility for subsequent repairs.
A defined offer lets a contributor assess what the gift will secure and lets the manager explain the associated care obligations. Indian cities could make those terms explicit without giving donors control over public space. The offer must also distinguish charitable giving, corporate sponsorship and commercial investment. An Indian company cannot assume that spending on publicity or employee-only activities qualifies as CSR expenditure. Recognition may help attract support, but neither a better catalogue nor a more generous benefit can guarantee demand where potential donors are scarce.
Revenue rights
In New York and London, public authorities specify the rights under which park managers receive and use commercial income. New York allocates concession rights and receipts through public approvals and separate agreements. The Royal Parks licence expressly permits the charity to retain park income, and trustees can hold reserves and spend across years. Both examples connect permitted commercial activity to a financial arrangement identifying who receives the money and how it may support the parks.
DDA’s adoption policy contemplates temporary kiosks, but has no automatic entitlement to operate a concession or retain its proceeds. Kolkata’s rental example leaves the recipient and use of receipts unclear. These gaps matter because a park manager cannot budget on the assumption that activity within the park will generate income available for its own bills. The agreement must identify who collects the receipts, what share reaches maintenance and which authority approves that use. The Indian examples establish permissions or rentals more clearly than a dependable flow of usable maintenance income.
Central Park uses restricted gifts and endowments with specified purposes and spending rules. The Royal Parks receives donations and grants alongside commercial income, and maintains reserves for future obligations. Although their funding mixes differ, both have an organisation able to hold money and apply it to park care beyond the year of receipt.
The Indian adoption arrangements described here provide a narrower route. BBMP’s published scheme accepts assets and services but prohibits direct cash acceptance under that policy. DDA envisages adopter-funded work but under its scheme there is a risk that a donated facility may leave the authority with future repair bills unless continuing care is separately funded. Collecting cash gifts, investing them and using distributions for maintenance would require an authorised recipient and explicit financial rules.
Bryant Park adds a further source of revenue through compulsory district assessments collected under New York’s BID framework. The reviewed Indian policies establish no equivalent park-specific assessment. Introducing one would require its own legal basis and district-governance arrangements, beyond an agreement with an individual donor or adopter.
Public safeguards
Mumbai’s caretaker controversies concern control of public land and the risk of restricted access. New York and London retain public ownership and regulate commercial uses. DDA also specifies access, maintenance and handback obligations. The question is whether the responsible authority can inspect performance, require correction and recover control. Chennai’s proposed monitoring tools and DDA’s service standards do provide mechanisms for supervision. I am however, not able to provide data on enforcement.
Some caveats are necessary. Donor wealth and commercial demand help sustain New York and London parks, and cannot be manufactured by improving contract terms. The same business models do not work for all parks. Professional fundraising, accounts and supervision also have costs that may be difficult for a small park to bear. For some parks, shared support or ordinary municipal provision may be more suitable. Public finance must therefore support dependable care where private resources are scarce, while making payments, revenue rights and maintenance obligations credible where complementary finance is feasible.
What public finance should do
Parks need money for improvements and continuing care, while free access limits how much of that cost can be charged to users. New York and London combine public support with donations and commercial income through organisations authorised to manage those resources. Indian cities already use adoption, contributed facilities and commercial permissions alongside publicly financed maintenance. The comparison in section 5 identifies the terms that make these arrangements workable: dependable operating finance, sufficient continuity, defined contributor benefits, usable revenue rights and enforceable public safeguards.
The task is therefore to connect private contributions to maintenance obligations that public agencies and park managers can honour. Permission to adopt a park, install a facility or operate a kiosk leaves important financial questions unresolved. The contributor needs to know what it will receive and how long its role will continue; the manager needs money it can use for the work promised. The case for complementary finance depends on completing that agreement, while recognising that donor wealth and commercial demand will limit what different parks can raise.
If public finance can support such commitments, private resources could fund rehabilitation, improve facilities and sustain better horticulture, cleaning and repairs without charging for every visit. Continuing gifts or permitted commercial receipts could help meet annual bills, while invested funds and reserves could provide for future care. Public money could then support a larger or better-maintained stock of accessible parks than it could finance alone. Where additional income meets costs at commercially attractive parks, public resources could also support neighbourhoods with fewer donors. These gains depend on contributions reaching maintenance, covering their own administrative costs and preserving public use.
Outsourcing alone does not mobilise private revenue. When a municipality pays a contractor or an RWA to maintain a park, the money still comes from the public budget. Better procurement may improve service or reduce its cost, but a change in provider does not establish an additional source of finance. Mobilisation requires contributions from outside that budget, whether gifts, privately funded work or income from permitted commercial activities. Central Park illustrates how the two functions can coexist: the city purchases services from an organisation that also raises private money. Its public payment and its fundraising perform different financial roles.
Additional income available for recurring care
Public finance should help mobilise resources that can meet recurring bills. A large capital gift cannot pay a gardener unless its terms allow money to be used for wages. Likewise, a busy cafe contributes to upkeep only if the financial arrangement directs usable receipts to maintenance. Central Park’s unrestricted gifts and London’s retained income show why the permitted use of money matters. The relevant gain is the additional maintenance that private resources can finance after fundraising, administration and supervision costs, accounting also for any public spending or existing income they displace.
A dependable public contribution can make that financing arrangement more credible. It gives a manager a funded service commitment around which to seek supplementary gifts or commercial income. Public authorities must still support essential care where those receipts fall short. The division of risk matters here: London’s charity bears ordinary maintenance risk, while DCMS retains major asset-failure risk. Asking a contributor to meet costs beyond its financial means can leave a park with unfunded obligations despite the apparent transfer of responsibility.
Capital contributions accompanied by continuing care
Public finance should mobilise both improvements and the resources needed to sustain them. A donated toilet brings cleaning, water and repair costs; a restored playground brings inspection and eventual replacement costs. The financial value of the gift depends partly on whether those obligations are covered. Central Park’s endowments illustrate one way of supporting future work, while DDA’s renewal terms and BBMP’s published short term raise the question of who continues care after an agreement ends. Capital funding, recognition and maintenance commitments therefore need compatible durations. A long care commitment can coexist with public ownership and free basic access.
Contributions matched to what participants value
Public finance should enable different contributors to support parks on terms suited to their motives. A commemorative donor may value recognition and lasting care; a company may support eligible environmental work; a commercial operator needs a defined opportunity to earn revenue. Central Park and the Royal Parks make some donor offers concrete through published dedication terms. DDA’s acknowledgement signs and event permissions provide an Indian starting point. The principle is to connect each contribution to a clear benefit and a funded public service, while keeping gifts, CSR, commercial sponsorship and concessions distinct. Public authorities must have the power to honour the recognition, income rights or payments they promise.
The ability to receive, manage and sustain contributions
Private finance also requires organisations capable of raising and using it. Central Park’s professional Conservancy manages donor relationships and restricted funds alongside park operations. The Royal Parks charity can retain income and hold reserves across years. Public support for accounting, fundraising and supervision may therefore help sustain contributions beyond a single restoration campaign. For smaller parks, shared administration or fiscal sponsorship may be more affordable than a separate organisation. Effective practices can operate within existing institutions. More reliable payments, consistent inspection and clearer donor reporting can improve how existing arrangements function within their authorised powers. Experience with those practices may reveal constraints that justify later changes to delegated powers, financial rules or organisational form. Formal redesign is therefore one possible response to experience, and its value depends on whether it enables better practice at a justified cost.
Different financing models for different parks
Public finance should support different financing models for parks with different earning potential. Large destination parks with visitor demand may combine a public maintenance contribution with concession fees, event income and organised fundraising. Neighbourhood parks with a willing donor base may draw on recurring gifts or adopter-funded care alongside municipal services. Parks with little commercial demand or donor support will need predominantly public finance, whether maintenance is delivered directly or through contracts. For small parks, shared fundraising and accounting may cost less than separate organisations. Where lawful and compatible with donor restrictions, a multi-park arrangement could pool some income to support less commercially attractive sites. The choice must reflect each park’s costs, earning potential and public uses. Public allocations should follow service needs, so a park’s inability to attract donors does not become a reason for poorer care.
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Greater Chennai Corporation. 2022. “Council Resolution, 26 January 2022″. Recital referring to Special Officer Resolution 1073/2020 and the adoption conditions.
Anirudh Burman is a researcher at the XKDR Forum.
Source: https://blog.theleapjournal.org/2026/11/financing-better-public-parks-in-indian.html
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