Lawsuit Over Tweet Urging University to Fire Professor for Alleged "Racism, Sexism, and Transphobia" Can Go Forward

From Judge Jeffrey Schmehl’s decision in Manco v. St. Joseph’s University (E.D. Pa.):

On February 25, 2021, Loue tweeted at SJU  as follows: “but are you gonna fire Greg Manco who has done nothing but contribute to a hostile learning environment with his racism, sexism, and transphobia??????” SJU responded to Loue’s tweet by saying, “Saint Joseph’s continues to strive to be a welcoming, diverse and inclusive community. The University acts quickly to investigate reports of bias, harassment, and other incidents. Plaintiff then alleges that “Loue was never a student of Dr. Manco and knew this tweet to be false.”

Similar to the motions to dismiss previously filed by the other student defendants and decided by this Court in an opinion dated January 25, 2024, Loue argues that her tweet of February 25, 2021, enjoys absolute privilege as she conveyed information that commenced an investigation pursuant to federal statute or regulations. However, the instant tweet of Loue is distinguishable from the privileged communications between students and specific individuals at SJU who were involved in the investigation process. A general tweet directed to a private university cannot be found to have intended to commence an investigation.

The examples in the January 25, 2024, opinion where I found student communications were entitled to immunity were emails and direct correspondence to specific individuals at SJU, not just random public tweets. Loue’s tweet is not entitled to immunity for that reason.

Also, I find that her tweet was capable of a defamatory meaning as a person reviewing SJU’s Twitter account could read it and believe that Plaintiff is racist, sexist and/or transphobic. Accordingly, Loue’s Motion to Dismiss as to her February 25, 2021, tweet based upon immunity is denied.

Defendant Loue also seeks to have Plaintiff’s claim of false light dismissed. Under Pennsylvania law, to establish a false light claim, Plaintiff “must allege facts showing that the published material is not true, is highly offensive to a reasonable person, and is publicized with knowledge or in reckless disregard for its falsity.”

Whether the allegations contained in Loue’s tweet are false is contested, but taken in a light most favorable to Manco, they can be read to imply that there is some chance that Manco is a racist, sexist and/or is transphobic. This is certainly a negative implication. In a light most favorable to Manco, even if Loue’s Tweet was true, a “discrete presentation” could plausibly cast Plaintiff in a false light. Accordingly, this claim will also be allowed to remain.

Next, Loue seeks to have Plaintiff’s claim of tortious interference dismissed. First, accepting all allegations in the Second Amended Complaint as true, I find that Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts at this stage of the proceedings to allow his claim of tortious interference with contract as to Loue to proceed to discovery. Manco has pled that the student defendants “engaged in activities, … to have Dr. Manco suspended and his contract terminated.” It could be argued that these student activities allegedly interfered with Manco’s employment contract and were not justified. Therefore, I will allow this claim to remain as to Loue….

Note that many courts have held that general accusations of racism, anti-Semitism, and the like—or for that matter of Communism—are opinions and therefore can’t be libelous, but accusations that someone has done something racist or otherwise bigoted (or belongs to the Communist Party or some other group) are treated as factual and thus potentially libelous. To quote Judge Schmehl’s earlier opinion,

Defamation is a state law cause of action, and as such, what statements can be considered defamatory are subject to Pennsylvania law. In Pennsylvania, “a simple accusation of racism is not enough.” The accusation of racism must imply more, like suggesting “that the accused has personally broken the law in a racist manner.” In MacElree, for instance, there was an actionable accusation of racism because the defendant called the District Attorney “the David Duke of Chester County,” a statement that “implied that he was unlawfully abusing his power as district attorney, an elected office, to further racism.” See also Wolverton v. Padgett-Patterson (M.D. Pa. 2022) (finding that plaintiff’s allegations that defendant’s Facebook post accused him of racism and singled him out in public as a racist are not actionable in a defamation action)….

“Pure opinions cannot defame.” Opinions based on “disclosed facts are absolutely privileged, no matter how derogatory they are.” This holds true “even when an opinion is extremely derogatory, like calling another person’s statements `anti-Semitic’.” But an opinion that can reasonably be understood to “imply undisclosed defamatory facts may support a cause of action based upon those unenumerated facts.”

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