review of Richard Reeves' "Of Boys and Men"

In his book Of Boys and Men, Brookings Institution scholar Richard Reeves brings welcome attention to the struggles of men and boys in contemporary society. (He focuses on American society, but sporadically notes that this is a general phenomenon in developed countries. From the limited international data and anecdotes, it seems likely that American problems are worse.) He has a clever opening line—that his concern for his own boys has bled over into his day job, into worries about boys and men in society (x). He revisits the same angle in his conclusion, noting that even staunch feminists are concerned for their own boys (183). 

Reeves hopes to add to a sporadic literature (x) and normalize the topic. In a word, he does a terrific job in discussing the problems of boys and men with respect to education, labor markets, and family. But his proposed solutions are less impressive, suffering from the inherent limits of public policy, sins of commission (unwarranted optimism about some well-intentioned proposals), and sins of omission (a reluctance to discuss certain problems/solutions).  

Reeves notes that society and elites often focus on race, class, and gender. But the focus on gender rarely includes men, despite obvious problems for men revealed by traditional metrics. Analysis, reporting, and levels of concern are wildly inconsistent between the genders. Likely reasons include inertia, ignorance, and lack of imagination. In covering his flank, Reeves cites another cause: that defense of men is often seen as an attack on women. He is careful to say (repeatedly) that one can be in support of both men and women—that we can hold two thoughts in our heads at the same time. In a word, it should be women and men, rather than women vs. men. (As an aside, Reeves argues for [only] two genders, while describing other expressions of genders as exceptions to this rule [89, 121]. It was reasonable to avoid the topic of transgenders in women’s sports, but it’s unfortunate that he doesn’t at least mention Abigail Shrier’s fine book with its focus on gender.) 

In part, this is related to a broader fallacy—conflating the win/win of economic markets with the win/lose of political markets. Ironically, people often ignorantly imagine a zero-sum economic world, while somehow perversely imagining a positive-sum political world. Although counterexamples are possible in both realms, these exceptions only serve to illustrate the rules. Given the subtle and long-term costs of government intervention, this is an easy but regrettable and immensely damaging intellectual mistake to make.  

In terms of the rhetoric, a related issue is the inconsistent use of terms such as “systemic racism”. Even when the concepts are defined in a coherent manner, they are rarely applied consistently. (When those wielding the term won’t start such a discussion with government’s K-12 education and the impact of welfare policies on family structure and stability, you can know that you’re dealing with a rube or someone who thinks you’re a rube.) In the context of gender, we might imagine a concept such as “systemic genderism”. But even if so, Reeves would argue that it would usually be applied only to women.  

Reeves is also really helpful on the relevant basic statistical concepts. We often hear comparisons of averages/means, without understanding the overlap in the underlying group distributions (24). Even if group X has higher average outcomes than group Y, it can still be quite likely that any given individual in group Y will have better outcomes than any given person in group X or even the average X. Averages matter, but don’t get too excited about them.  

In Chapter 1, Reeves details the struggle of boys and men with education: fewer AP courses, lower GPA’s, lower graduation rates from HS and college, and fewer study abroad experiences. Women have made remarkable strides in higher ed, especially in grad school. Another concern, looking forward: males struggle more with on-line education (4). Interestingly, the federal government does not require states to report data by gender (7-8), when it does for race, class, and other factors. As for explanations of these gender gaps, Reeves emphasizes biology and the timing of brain development (8-11). But he also asserts an “aspiration gap”—a fuzzy but likely difference in the hopes and goals of men and women these days (17).   

In Chapter 2, Reeves turns to the world of work, including sobering numbers—e.g., one-third of men ages 25-54 with a high school education are not in the labor force (19). He notes that women’s wages have risen while men’s have declined slightly (23). While it’s useful to see the contrast, ignoring other forms of compensation is a common but regrettable compromise. 

Reeves notes that the overall gender pay gap is “math not myth” (26), but then asks the more important question: why? Here, he thankfully goes beyond univariate analysis, focusing on women’s frequently-intermittent labor market focus in child-bearing years. For decades, childless men and women have had equivalent labor market outcomes.  

In terms of men’s labor market struggles, he points to automation and trade—causing increased labor market competition, especially in male-dominated fields. Exacerbating the problem: women have moved into male-dominated fields (notably, in STEM [science, tech, engineering, math]), while men have not returned the favor (notably, in HEAL [health, education, admin, literacy]). 

In Chapter 3, Reeves discusses family and culture, including noteworthy numbers (e.g., 30% of wives outearn their husbands) and sobering stats (e.g., 40% of all children are born into non-married households, but the percentage is much higher in lower income classes [35]). “The separation of men from women too often means the separation of fathers from children. This is bad for men, bad for women, and bad for children.” (41).  

Ironically, expectations of prospective husbands have been static, especially among the lower income classes where the drop-offs have been particularly severe—what he calls “culture lagging economics” (36-37). Reeves says that women’s places in society and economy have changed, while men’s have remained stagnant. He argues that a change in expectations for men is appropriate given the changes for women—and thus, men.  

Reeves will discuss welfare later, but one would hope for a significant mention of this by now in the book. The fact is that government has become a substitute for men, given payment incentives to be unmarried. And there is a connection between women’s welfare and men’s work as well. To the extent that men can mooch on women in relationships, the incentive to work is reduced. Another omission: Reeves discussed education in chapter 2, but there is little or no effort to connect poor educational outcomes (in government schools) to the job market woes in chapter 3.  

Reeves is also interested in “intersectionality” (46)—how gender intersects with race, class, etc. in chapters 4-5. In terms of class and gender, “deaths of despair” (from Case and Deaton) are three times higher for men than women—and these problems are concentrated in the lower income classes (60). Men have 70% of the opioid deaths, with half of prime-age males out of the labor force on prescription pain medicine in 2016 (62). Men are three times as likely to commit suicide (63). Here, welfare gets a brief mention—that women see men “as just another mouth to feed, an inversion of the men’s expected role.” (64)  

Reeves cites Sawhill’s research (65) on class, marriage, and births in/out of marriage, but he should have referenced Murray’s powerful work, Coming Apart. (He does cite Murray’s Human Diversity on gender later—as “a thorough, mostly balanced, summary”. [125]) One irony: the women with the most independence are far more likely to get married and stay married (65). “I don’t think Gloria Steinem or anyone else thought that this was how things would unfold.” The impact of tough neighborhoods and peer effects is stronger for boys (70). The impact of family structure on educational outcomes is also rougher for boys (71).  

With Trump’s choice of J.D. Vance, class will continue to be a political factor, at least from the GOP side. (If you haven’t read it or seen the movie, Hillbilly Elegy is worth a look.) Still, far more could have been said here. Reeves notes the impact of family structure on children, but provides few cites about that impact, especially on boys. This is unfortunate (and telling), since the literature on single-parent households and children (especially boys) is voluminous, powerful, and not at all surprising. Reeves goes light here—and barely works to close the loop with respect to the welfare policies that have contributed significantly.  

In terms of race and gender, Reeves points to educational outcomes (50) and to prison and the War on Drugs (53). Again, the inconvenience of the simplistic ideological metrics is in play here again: “There is a real reluctance to focus on the particular challenges faced by Black boys and men…[it] doesn’t fit into the binary models of racism and sexism that many are comfortable with.” (58) He notes in passing that “Black boys seem to benefit even more than others from engaged fatherhood” (56), but the attention devoted to this key variable is too little. 

As with gender by itself, the cherry-picking extends into “intersectionality”. Again, the answers are “inconvenient” and thus, usually ignored. “Class warriors downplay gender concerns…gender warriors play down class concerns…But inequalities of class and gender have to be considered together, especially when they pull in opposite directions.” (61) The same holds true with race and gender (along with class): when black women are doing much better than black men and even white men, what are gender or race ideologues to do?  

In chapter 7, Reeves turns to the role of biology. He notes that men tend to be more aggressive/violent and more likely to take risks and engage in heroism (89-92). Men are more interested in sex (93), so getting rid of “sex workers” is wishful thinking. (He recommends decriminalizing prostitution.) And then he goes “intersectional” again, noting the interplay between gender, culture, and family structure (94-95).  

In chapters 8-9, Reeves throws hammers at both the Left and the Right. He claims that the Left makes too little of biology, while the Right makes too much of it. The aversion to science on the Left is odd and noteworthy, given the prevailing rhetoric and conventional (incorrect) wisdom on such things. Again, differences in groups don’t necessarily imply differences between individuals. Moreover, differences don’t have to be universally good/bad. And even if so, bad differences for one group can easily be offset by good differences within the same group. His conclusion: “Denying science altogether is not useful…The rather boring truth is that masculine traits are more useful in some contexts and feminine ones in others.” (87) 

Reeves finds “toxic masculinity” to be an unethical, inconsistent, and impractical term. Unethical in slandering immaturity and naturally-occurring traits. Impractical in pushing boys to the “online manosphere” instead of engaging them in dialogue—and driving men to the opposing political and ideological side. Inconsistent in that the same terminology is not applied to girls who behave badly. He also notes that the Left inverts its usual penchant for blaming external factors rather than the individual. Bottom line: the Left is only willing to talk about gender when it comes to women’s disadvantages. This is intellectually dishonest and not helpful to society.  

Perhaps someone from the Left would critique aspects of his argument (although I didn’t catch anything). In terms of the Right, it’s mostly fine, except for his strange insistence on their advocacy of “traditional marriage” rather than merely marriage. I’m sure there’s some of the former within the Right, but I don’t see it as a major player. I’m not sure whether he sees the world this way or was merely looking for a convenient dichotomy to look unbiased. He does make an interesting point about marriage—that it worked in the past, while reducing autonomy of both men and women (34).  

Reeves also pokes at conservatives for not having good policy ideas. But this is mostly the pot calling the kettle black. In chapter 6, he notes that policy doesn’t generally work well in this realm (77). In chapters 10-12, Reeves turns to policy in education, labor, and family, but leaves the (educated) reader feeling less than satisfied. Political leadership is bereft (184), so this should encourage more realism than wishful thinking from Reeves. In any case, there is little that government can do; these are largely cultural matters. Related: Reeves points to the possibility of Affirmative Action for men in education (14-15), but notes that this can’t be a long-term solution. Another odd omission: absolutely no mention of the Church (and the relevant literatures).  

One last point: Reeves points to gains for women since Title IX (3). But it’s not clear the extent to which those gains are caused by vs. merely correlated with Title IX. An irony: to the extent one thinks it’s causal, then they should now be eager to advocate government remedies for men in some settings. If not, we’re back to the sort of inconsistencies one often sees in these realms. 

We must do better. But the solutions are largely individual and cultural—and surely, even for a secular social scientist, the Gospel and the Church have a significant role to play. At the end of the day, Reeves’ book is really good at pointing fingers, but not so much in helping us find answers.