Iowa S. Ct. Adopts Federal Courts' Presumption Against Pseudonymity

Federal courts have long had a strong presumption against pseudonymity; the cases I discuss in The Law of Pseudonymous Litigation are mostly federal cases. Some states have done the same, but many states don’t have a lot of caselaw on the subject. In Friday’s Doe v. Western Dubuque Comm. School Dist., the Iowa Supreme Court (in a unanimous opinion by Justice Christopher McDonald), generally adopted the federal approach:

Minor Doe, Father Doe, and Mother Doe filed suit against a school district and several school district officials and employees after Minor Doe was attacked by another student during school. The Does asserted claims for negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and loss of consortium….

On January 12, 2023, Minor Doe was an eighth-grade student attending Drexler Middle School in the Western Dubuque Community School District. She was participating in an industrial arts technology class when another student assaulted her over the head with a board…. According to the petition, the school did not contact proper medical personnel or Minor Doe’s parents after the assault…. Minor Doe was diagnosed with a concussion and other injuries….

The substantive analysis in the decision discussed governmental immunities, fiduciary duties, and related matters, but the court had this to say about pseudonymity:

We conclude that pseudonymous petitions are generally disfavored but that there may be some circumstances in which they are allowed. Those circumstances were not met here ….

[Iowa Rule of Electronic Procedure] 16.602(4) provides that the “[n]ames of minor children” are protected information. This means only that the “names” of minor children are not included within filings. Under our practice, parties use the minor’s initials to avoid disclosure of the name. While the rule treats the “names” of minor children as protected information, the rule does not treat the “identity” of the minor child as protected information.

In other words, the rule does not require the omission of any and all information in a filing that could be used to discern the identity of the minor. Any such reading is impractical and inconsistent with actual practice. For example, spouses in a dissolution proceeding typically use their real names in filings and the initials of any children mentioned in the filings even though the children are easily identifiable….

In federal courts, the use of fictitious names is disfavored. “The use of fictitious names runs afoul of the public’s First Amendment interest in public proceedings and their common law right of access thereto. Proceedings are only truly public when the public knows the identities of the litigants.” … “Certainly, ‘[i]dentifying the parties to the proceeding is an important dimension of publicness. The people have a right to know who is using their courts.’” …

Despite being disfavored, most circuits have nonetheless concluded that the use of fictitious names is permissible and have adopted a balancing test to determine when parties can proceed under a fictitious name. Relevant factors to consider typically include whether the party seeking anonymity is challenging government activity, whether identification of the party would threaten revelation of sensitive and highly personal information, the risk of prosecution, the risk of retaliation, fundamental unfairness to the defendant, the public interest, and the existence of alternative options. These considerations are not exclusive.

Under federal law, even when no party objects to an anonymous pleading, “the judge has an independent duty to determine whether exceptional circumstances justify such a departure from the normal method of proceeding in federal courts.” “Because a district court must exercise discretion in the course of weighing competing interests, … an abuse of discretion standard of review is appropriate.” “Under this deferential standard of review, we must affirm the district court’s ruling unless the district court failed to consider a factor that should have been given significant weight, considered an improper factor, or committed a clear error of judgment in the course of weighing proper factors.”

We agree with these persuasive precedents and hold that there is a presumption against allowing a party to proceed under a fictitious name and that a party may proceed “under a fictitious name only in those limited circumstances where the party’s need for anonymity outweighs countervailing interests in full disclosure.” A party seeking to file under a pseudonym should do so on motion and bears the burden of establishing that the need for anonymity outweighs the countervailing interests.

We need not identify all of the factors relevant to this determination at this point in time because the plaintiffs have not even made a threshold showing that there is a need for anonymity here. The record demonstrates that the plaintiffs and defendants were in communication prior to the filing of this suit and that the defendants already knew the identity of the plaintiffs, including the identity of Minor Doe. In addition, the plaintiffs have not, on this record, identified any serious threat or irregularity that would require anonymity. On remand, the plaintiffs shall be afforded an opportunity to amend their pleadings and use their real names in accordance with the Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure and Iowa Rules of Electronic Procedure. The plaintiffs shall use Minor Doe’s initials rather than identifying her by name….

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