Federal Judge Sues for Libel, Court Calls (Some) Arguments on His Side "Frivolous" and "Absurd"

The decision, by Judge Roy Altman (S.D. Fla.) is Monday’s Block v. Matesic; for more on the plaintiff judge (Judge Frederick Block (E.D.N.Y.)), see this N.Y. Times article, also from Monday.

The original libel claim has to do with the plaintiff judge’s battles related to his Florida condominium association board, of all things. A few excerpts, from the discussion of plaintiff’s arguments that defendant must have known that the statements about plaintiff were false or at least likely false (the so-called “actual malice” test):

[1.]

[W]e use “Florida’s substantive law” to determine whether the words of the December 18 Email are competent evidence of express malice. As it happens, they aren’t.

Block says that the “letter itself evinces ill-will” because the Defendants referred to him as “disgruntled” and said that he was “regurgitating” certain information. This “utterly gratuitous” language, Block says, reveals that “the publication’s true, primary intent was to discredit [Block's] analysis and defame him by way of retribution.” Filling in the gaps for Block, the reasoning seems to be that the Defendants’ words show their ill intent towards him, and that ill intent (he seems to be saying) evinces their actual malice. Block doesn’t argue—nor could he—that the words “disgruntled” and “regurgitate” in any way demonstrate the Defendants’ knowledge of the falsity of their statement. We therefore take him to be arguing that the Defendants’ word choice shows that the Defendants intended the defamatory implication of the December 18 Email.

Unfortunately for Block, his argument is absurd. As we noted, “disgruntled” means “unhappy and annoyed.” Was Block disgruntled? Yes—obviously. And to “regurgitate” means “to throw or pour back or out from or as if from a cavity.” “Typically,” it refers to something— say, information—that has “been taken in, at least partially digested, and then spit back out.” We don’t think that “regurgitate” connotes something strictly negative, but Block’s argument isn’t more persuasive even when we infer (as we must) that the Defendants meant it disparagingly. “Strong, angry, or intemperate words do not alone show express malice.” Under Florida law, “words themselves” inherently “demonstrate express malice” only when they are “so extreme.”

Obviously, to satisfy a standard that regards mere garden-variety “extreme” words as insufficient, the words must be genuinely incendiary [citing cases which did involve incendiary language -EV] …. “Disgruntled” and “regurgitated” pale in comparison. And Block doesn’t cite a single case in which any court treated such anodyne words as evidence of express (let alone actual) malice. In fact, faced with much nastier statements, the cases do the opposite.

[2.]

Block also suggests that “[t]he ongoing Tower One controversy” itself “furnishes proof of malice” because a “jury [could] conclude … that Block’s detailed critique had embarrassed the[ ] [Defendants], and that they wished to strike back at him.” In other words, Block is offering his own email as “evidence” of the state of mind with which the Defendants sent the December 18 Email. This “argument” is frivolous on its face, and we won’t deign to address it further.

[3.]

Block doesn’t offer any argument (or cite a single case) to explain why the inherent implausibility of an implication is entitled to any particular weight, and we won’t fill in that gap for him.

Judge Altman has some choice words for the defendants as well, e.g.:

The Defendants attack Block’s testimony as “self-serving”—bizarre, given that this testimony helps them—but mercifully avoid further self-defeating arguments….

[W]e agree that it’s ridiculous to think that Block is a hacker and said as much when we disposed of the Defendants’ first motion to dismiss…

[Defendant] assumed the burden of proving special damages at summary judgment when he alleged (in our view, absurdly) that Block’s 2023 Text Messages defamed him….

Matesic hasn’t found a single case (nor have we) suggesting that any of these statements could reasonably be construed as malicious. And he’s adduced no evidence—not from any expert, Tower One resident, or even from his own Board—for his view that these statements demonstrated “express malice.”

Both the plaintiff’s defamation claim and the defendants’ defamation counterclaims end up getting dismissed.

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