How to remove TSA’s conflict of interest

Introduction

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) was enacted by Congress in 2001, just 10 weeks after terrorists hijacked four commercial airplanes on September 11th. In their haste to beef up aviation security, Congress built in a basic flaw: the new agency was designed to be both the regulator and a major provider of airport security services.

The Senate bill’s “complete federal takeover” of airport security made TSA both the regulator and the provider of nearly all airport screening, a built-in conflict of interest. The House bill allowed five airports to use private security contractors, selected by the new TSA.

This policy brief traces the evolution of airport security under TSA, pointing out conflicts due to its dual role as both regulator and provider, and recounts the slow growth of airports contracting with TSA-selected private firms under the agency’s Screening Partnership Program (SPP). Based on this evidence and a comparison of the U.S. approach with those of other countries, this brief recommends ways to improve the current system.

This policy brief reports on studies showing that SPP airports’ performance is equal to or better than that of non-SPP airports, and that private screeners are more productive and hence cost less than TSA screeners (San Francisco International versus Los Angeles International data). These findings support the idea that TSA should be the aviation security regulator, but that airports should be served by their choice of airport screening company.

Accordingly, Congress should change U.S. airport security provision.

First, it should terminate TSA’s dual role as both aviation security regulator and provider of the vast majority of airport screening. After converting TSA to a regulatory-only role, Congress should devolve checkpoint and checked-baggage screening to airports, as is common practice in Canada, Europe, and many other countries.

Airports could either self-provide by hiring checkpoint and checked-baggage screeners, or they could contract with their choice of TSA-approved screening companies. Because all screening would be the airport’s responsibility, screeners would be paid for by each airport, which would address the current problem of screeners not being paid during federal shutdowns.

This reform would align with aviation security practices in Australia, Canada, and Europe. In those countries, the national aviation security agency is purely a regulator, and airports are responsible for providing and paying for checkpoint and checked-baggage screening. The United States should emulate their aviation security policies.

Airport organizations, such as Airports Council International-North America (ACI-NA) and the American Association of Airport Executives (AAAE) should embrace this reform, as should U.S. airlines. It is a global best practice in aviation that has long been aviation policy in most developed countries.

Full policy brief: Fixing TSA’s Conflict of Interest

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