Weekly Commentary: If Iran Changes, Israel Must Move First - Or Turkey Will

Weekly Commentary: If Iran Changes, Israel Must Move First – Or Turkey Will
Dr. Aaron Lerner 31 January 2026

1. A rare strategic opening

1.1. A potential regime change in Iran would be one of the most consequential strategic moments Israel has faced since the end of the Cold War.

1.2. For decades, Iran has been the ideological engine and operational backbone of the regional confrontation against Israel.

1.3. A genuine political rupture in Tehran would dismantle that framework almost overnight.

1.4. History shows that such openings do not wait to be debated at leisure-they are either seized early or shaped by others.

2. Normalization must be immediate, not tentative

2.1. If a post-regime-change Iran seeks international legitimacy, there is no clearer signal than full diplomatic normalization with Israel.

2.2. Such a move would demonstrate to Washington, Europe, and the region that Iran has exited the revolutionary framework that has defined Middle Eastern politics for a generation.

2.3. For Israel, this means normalization must be fast, comprehensive, and unmistakable: embassies, public declarations, and formal recognition.

2.4. Delay – waiting for perfect stability or full internal consolidation-would invite third parties to manage Iran’s reintegration instead.

2.5. In transitional moments, defaults are set early, and hesitation allows others to define the relationship.

3. Why Turkey, not Iran, becomes the central challenge

3.1. Once Iran exits the confrontation framework, the regional balance does not stabilize – it reconfigures.

3.2. In that environment, Turkey is uniquely positioned to move first.

3.3. Turkey does not need to dominate Iran; it only needs to become the easiest and most influential land-based interface for Iran’s access to Europe and NATO-adjacent systems.

3.4. Economic default status can later be translated – quietly but effectively – into political and strategic leverage.

3.5. Turkey’s advantage lies in speed, geography, and institutional familiarity, especially during periods of transition.

3.6. If Israel does not act early, Iran’s strategic break risks becoming Ankara’s strategic gain.

4. Saudi Arabia’s potential role to enhancing alternatives to the Turkish link

4.1. Preventing Turkish gatekeeping does not require confrontation; it requires credible additional options that markets are willing to use.

4.2. As Iran reintegrates, the goal should be to ensure that its trade and energy links are spread across multiple viable routes rather than concentrated in a single country’s land corridors – an approach that Saudi Arabia is uniquely positioned to help enable.

4.3. Saudi Arabian interests would be served supporting this kind of corridor plurality by financing and anchoring Gulf-based rail, port, and energy connections to supplement existing maritime routes.,

4.4. In such a scenario, it would be critical for Israel, quietly and behind the scenes, to be involved in shaping these arrangements to ensure that they do not later become sources of leverage against it.

5. Speed itself is the strategy

5.1. Normalization with a new Iran does not imply dependence, security integration, or strategic naivety.

5.2. It reflects a basic reality: in transitional moments, speed shapes outcomes more than declarations of intent.

5.3. Israel can front-load diplomacy while back-loading risk and institutional commitments.

5.4. What Israel cannot afford is hesitation that allows others to lock in structural advantages during the transition window.

6. The bottom line

6.1. Iran’s potential transformation would open a historic door for Israel.

6.2. That door will not remain open indefinitely.

6.3. Failure to act swiftly cedes initiative to Turkey – turning Iran’s strategic break into Ankara’s strategic gain.

6.4. Israel’s task is therefore clear: be positioned to move early, normalize decisively, and shape the regional landscape before defaults harden and leverage shifts beyond Israel’s ability to influence developments.
________________________________________
IMRA – Independent Media Review and Analysis

Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on Arab-Israeli relations

Source: https://www.imra.org.il/story.php?id=74412