The Nature of Change of War

By MG Paul E Vallely (RET)

War will remain a human endeavor, a conflict between two forces. Yet, changes in the political landscape, adaptations by the enemy, and advances in technology and techniques will change the character of the battle. Leaders are often late to recognize such changes; even when they do, inertia tends to limit their ability to adapt quickly. Driven by an inherent desire to bring order to a disorderly, chaotic universe, human beings tend to frame their thoughts about the future in terms of continuities and extrapolations from the present and, occasionally, the past. But a brief look at the past quarter century, to say nothing of the past four thousand years, suggests the extent of changes that the coming decades will bring.

Twenty-five years ago, the Cold War encompassed every aspect of the American military’s thinking and preparation for conflict – from the strategic level to the tactical. Today, that all-consuming preoccupation is a historical relic. A quarter century ago, the United States confronted the Soviet Union, a cruel, intractable opponent with leaders firmly committed to spreading Marxist-Leninist ideology and expanding their influence. At that time, few in the intelligence communities or even among Sovietologists recognized the deepening internal crisis of confidence that would lead to the implosion of the Soviet Empire. The opposing sides had each deployed tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, as well as vast armies, air forces, and navies across the globe. Soviet troops were occupying Afghanistan and appeared on the brink of crushing an uprising of ill-equipped, ill-trained guerrillas. In El Salvador, a Soviet-backed insurgency was on the verge of victory.

Beyond the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union lay a world that differed enormously from today. China was only emerging from the dark years of Mao’s rule. To China’s south, India remained mired in an almost medieval level of poverty, from which it appeared unlikely to escape. To the sub-continent’s west, the Middle East was as plagued by political and religious troubles as today. But no one could have predicted then that within 25 years, the United States would wage two major wars against Saddam Hussein’s regime and commit much of its ground power to suppressing simultaneous insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The differences between the culture and organization of the American military then and now further underline the extent of the disruptions in the past. The lack of coordination among the forces involved in overthrowing the “New Jewel” movement in Grenada in October 1983 reminds us that at the time joint operations was a concept honored more in the breach than observance. That situation led to the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986. Regarding capabilities, stealth did not yet exist outside of the research and development communities. The M-1 Tank and the Bradley Fighting Vehicle were only starting to reach the army’s forward-deployed units. The Global Positioning System (GPS) did not exist. The training ranges of the National Training Center, Twenty-Nine Palms, Fallon, and Nellis were beginning to change U.S. preparations for war. The precision attack was a problem to be solved with tactical nuclear weapons. One might also note how much the economic and technological landscapes outside of the military have changed. Economically, in 1983, globalization was in its first stages and primarily involved trade among the United States, Europe, and Japan. Southeast Asian tigers were emerging, but the rest of the world seemed caught in inescapable poverty. To give one example: in 1983 the daily transfer of capital among international markets was approximately $20 billion. Today, it is $1.6 trillion.

On the technological side, the Internet existed only in the Department of Defense, and its economic and communications possibilities and implications for the civilian world were not yet apparent. Cellular phones came equipped with briefcases and shoulder straps and only worked in select urban areas. Personal computers were beginning to become widespread, but their reliability was terrible. Microsoft was emerging from Bill Gates’ garage, while Google existed only in the wilder writings of science fiction writers. In other words, the revolution in information and communications technologies, taken for granted today, was essentially unimaginable in 1983. A revolution had begun, but its implications remained uncertain and unclear. Other advances in science since 1983, such as the completion of the human genome project, nanotechnologies, and robotics, also seem the provenance of science fiction writers.

In thinking about the world’s trajectory, we have reason to believe that the next twenty-five years will bring changes just as dramatic, drastic, and disruptive as those in the past quarter century. Indeed, the pace of technological and scientific change is increasing. Changes will occur throughout the energy, financial, political, strategic, operational, and technological domains. How drastic, disruptive, and surprising these changes might be is at present not discernible, and in some cases, their full impact will not be understood until they are upon us. The interplay between continuities and disruptions will demand a Joint Force to see what has changed and what endures. The force must then adapt to those changes while recognizing the value of fundamental principles. That can only result from a historically minded mentality that can raise the right questions and develop and execute the right strategies that lead to Victory.

Grand Strategy – The Challenge of Disruptions

Threats and trends may suggest possibilities and potential strategies. Still, they may sometimes be misleading and unreliable for understanding the future because they interact with and are influenced by other factors. The downturn of Wall Street after the crash of 1929 might well have remained a recession, but the passage of the Smoot-Hawley tariffs destroyed American trade with other nations and turned the recession into a catastrophic global depression. In considering the future, one should not underestimate the ability of a few individuals, even a single person, to determine the course of events. One may reasonably predict that human beings will act in similar behavior patterns in the future, but when, where, and how remains entirely unpredictable. The rise of a future Stalin, Hitler, or Lenin is entirely possible but completely unpredictable, and the context in which they might reach the top is unforeseeable. The interplay of economic trends, vastly different cultures and historical experiences, and the peculiarities of leaders, among a host of other factors, provides such complexity in their interactions as to make prediction impossible. Winston Churchill caught those complexities best in his masterful history of World War I:

One rises from the study of the causes of the Great War with a prevailing.

sense of the defective control of individuals

upon world fortunes. It has been well said, ‘there is

always more error than design in human affairs.’ The limited

minds of the ablest men, their disputed authority, the climate

of opinion in which they dwell, their transient and

partial contributions to the mighty problem, that problem

itself so far beyond their compass, so vast in

scale and detail, so changing in its aspects.

all this must surely be considered…

Thus, individuals and their quirks, genius, and incompetence are major actors in these disruptions. Yet, we should not be discouraged from gaining as deep an understanding as possible of the historical influences of potential political and military leaders at the strategic, operational, and tactical level.

Not all disruptions occur through the actions of individual leaders. Significant events involving the overthrow of regimes, the collapse of economic systems, natural disasters, and significant conflicts within or among states have taken the flow of history and channeled it into new and unforeseen directions. Such disruptions are truly unpredictable, like the 2011 Japan earthquake and Tsunami, except that we can be sure that they will happen again. They will twist the future into new and unforeseen directions. In some cases, they will be apocalyptic. Here, the only strategy that can mitigate the impact of surprise is knowledge of the past, an understanding of the present, and a balanced entity and people willing and able to adapt in the future.

The “As in a building, which, however fair and beautiful the

superstructure is radically marred.

and imperfect if the foundations be insecure — so if

the strategy be wrong, the skill of the general

on the battlefield, the courage of the soldier, the brilliancy

of victory, however otherwise decisive, fail of their effect. Mahan

Future Leaders and Commanders must develop and implement a grand strategy, but they must fully understand and be a part of the endgame it seeks to achieve. They will have a role to play in planning and executing how the Armed Forces and other government organizations will be used and the means necessary for the effective use to protect the interests of the United States and its people. Thus, their professionalism, wisdom, and advice as military leaders will be essential to cast successful responses to strategic challenges and threats. In the twentieth century, the relationship in the United States between political vision and military leaders responsible for policy execution proved crucial in winning two world wars and the Cold War.

Yet the dialogue and discourse between those responsible for casting grand strategy and those responsible for conducting military operations has always involved tension because their world perspectives inevitably differ. Also, many political appointees and policy wonks have not had the adequate background of experience to properly guide the Commander in Chief in strategy and operations. In the future, Joint Force commanders must understand the ends of strategy and policy to recommend the forces required (the means) to achieve those ends, and policymakers must be aware of the strengths, limitations, and potential costs of the employment of military forces. The relationship between ends and means drives the logic of joint operations. Only clear and unfettered military advice and wisdom from senior commanders to policymakers and Commander-in-Chief can provide the understanding required to employ the Joint Force effectively.

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