DEEP STATE: U.S. Intel Suppressed China Interference Evidence to Undermine Trump

If you want to know what the Deep State looks like, this is a great example.

Analysts inside the U.S. intelligence community sought to conceal evidence of Chinese influence efforts from President Donald Trump during the 2020 election, with analysts saying they didn’t want their intel used by “that vulgarian in the Oval Office” to pursue policies toward China they personally disagreed with. The revelation is found within a January 2021 report written by — and never before reported upon comments by — analytic ombudsman Barry Zulauf, who conducted a review of the spy community’s handling of Russian versus Chinese meddling efforts during the 2020 election. Among his conclusions was that intelligence analysts downplayed China’s actions because they had disdain for the “vulgarian” Trump and did not want to support the policies and priorities of the Trump administration toward China with which they “personally disagree.” Just the News reported this week that the U.S. intelligence community has known since early 2020 that Beijing also gained access to American voter registration data and used that information to conduct opinion analysis related to the presidential election between Trump and then-former Vice President Joe Biden. (Just the News)

Technocrats hate democracyThese swamp creatures should be prison.

US intel hid Chinese 2020 election meddling from Trump because they opposed his policies, memo says

Dr. Barry A. Zulauf, a member of the Senior National Intelligence Service reported that others in the intelligence community said “I don’t want my intelligence going to the White House where it will be used by that vulgarian in the Oval Office to support policies against China with which I personally disagree.”

By: Jerry Dunleavy, Just The News, March 17, 2026:

Analysts inside the U.S. intelligence community sought to conceal evidence of Chinese influence efforts from President Donald Trump during the 2020 election, with analysts saying they didn’t want their intel used by “that vulgarian in the Oval Office” to pursue policies toward China they personally disagreed with.

The revelation is found within a January 2021 report written by — and never before reported upon comments by — analytic ombudsman Barry Zulauf, who conducted a review of the spy community’s handling of Russian versus Chinese meddling efforts during the 2020 election. Among his conclusions was that intelligence analysts downplayed China’s actions because they had disdain for the “vulgarian” Trump and did not want to support the policies and priorities of the Trump administration toward China with which they “personally disagree.”

Just the News reported this week that the U.S. intelligence community has known since early 2020 that Beijing also gained access to American voter registration data and used that information to conduct opinion analysis related to the presidential election between Trump and then-former Vice President Joe Biden.

Chinese government election influence efforts in the 2020 election

This is not the only piece of evidence pointing to Chinese government election influence efforts in the 2020 election. Although much about China’s activities in 2020 remains classified, Just the News conducted a thorough review of publicly-available intelligence assessments, federal indictments, foreign government warnings, and cybersecurity firm analyses.

There is credible evidence that Chinese government-linked cyber hackers and Chinese social media troll farms took aim at the U.S. presidential election in 2020 and sought to undercut Trump during his run against now-former President Biden. There are also indicators that Chinese intelligence and law enforcement agencies — China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS) and its Ministry of Public Security (MPS) — also played a role in 2020.

Zulauf — a longtime intelligence officer — wrote in his January 2021 report: “Given analytic differences in the way Russia and China analysts examined their targets, China analysts appeared hesitant to assess Chinese actions as undue influence or interference. These analysts appeared reluctant to have their analysis on China brought forward because they tended to disagree with the Administration’s policies, saying in effect, I don’t want our intelligence used to support those policies.”

U.S. intel analysts downplayed China assessments to avoid helping Trump
Zulauf discussed his report on a podcast later that year, where he quoted an analyst working on Chinese interference efforts as having essentially said that “I don’t want my analysis going to the White House where that vulgarian … in the White House will use it to pursue policies toward China with which I personally disagree.”

An article in the Journal of Intelligence Conflict and Warfare recounted a 2023 speech by Zulauf, who said that the intelligence analyst was quoted as saying that “I don’t want my intelligence going to the White House where it will be used by that vulgarian in the Oval Office to support policies against China with which I personally disagree.”

“Dr. Zulauf went on to point out the various errors in this way of thinking — intelligence belongs to the community, not a single analyst, and further, while analysts are entitled to like or dislike particular leaders, they are not entitled to allow that to alter the intelligence products that they put forward,” the journal article said.

The review by Zulauf also found that allegations of Russian meddling and Chinese meddling were being measured based on differing standards, meaning Russia may have taken actions that were determined to be influence or interference efforts while, if and when China took the same or similar actions, those Chinese actions likely would not have been determined to be influence or interference efforts.

“Due to varying collection and insight into hostile state actors’ leadership intentions and domestic election influence campaigns, the definitional use of the terms ‘influence’ and ‘interference’ and associated confidence levels are applied differently by the China and Russia analytic communities,” Zulauf wrote in his report.

The ombudsman found that “the terms were applied inconsistently across the analytic community” and that “failing to explain properly these definitions is inconsistent with Tradecraft Standards.”

“ODNI officials engaging with policymakers said that these customers did notice the result, particularly differences in the volume, frequency, and confidence levels of the intelligence coming from the China and Russia analytic communities on activities that, from their perspective, were very similar in their potential effects,” Zulauf added.

The analytic ombudsman noted that multiple national intelligence officers wrote an “Alternative Analysis Memo” in October 2020 “which expressed alternative views on potential Chinese election influence activities.” Zulauf said that “these alternative views met with considerable organizational counter pressure” but that then-DNI and now-Director of the Central Intelligence Agency John Ratcliffe agreed with the dissenting alternative views which argued that China had in fact attempted to influence the 2020 election to undercut Trump’s candidacy.

Majority view said China did not try to influence 2020 elections
The ODNI’s National Intelligence Council (NIC) released its intelligence community assessment on foreign threats to the 2020 election in March 2021, with ODNI saying that the majority view was that China did not ultimately try to meddle in the 2020 election, while the minority view — led by the national intelligence officer for cyber and other teams — said the Chinese did try to influence the election to hurt Trump’s reelection prospects.

“We assess that China did not deploy interference efforts and considered but did not deploy influence efforts intended to change the outcome of the U.S. Presidential election,” the ODNI said. “We have high confidence in this judgment. China sought stability in its relationship with the United States, did not view either election outcome as being advantageous enough for China to risk getting caught meddling.”

The majority view stated that “the IC assesses that Chinese state media criticism of the Trump administration’s policies related to China and its response to the COVID-19 pandemic remained consistent in the lead-up to the election and was aimed at shaping perceptions of U.S. policies and bolstering China’s global position rather than to affect the 2020 US election.”

“We assess that Beijing’s risk calculus against influencing the election was informed by China’s preference for stability in the bilateral relationship, their probable judgment that attempting to influence the election could do lasting damage to U.S.-China ties, and belief that the election of either candidate would present opportunities and challenges for China,” the majority view said. “Beijing probably judged that Russia’s efforts to interfere in the 2016 election significantly damaged Moscow’s position and relationship with the United States and may have worried that Washington would uncover a Chinese attempt to deploy similar measures to influence or interfere in the election and punish Beijing.”

The majority view also said that “China probably also continued longstanding efforts to gather information on U.S. voters and public opinion; political parties, candidates and their staffs; and senior government officials” but argued that “we assess Beijing probably sought to use this information to predict electoral outcomes and to inform its efforts to influence U.S. policy toward China under either election outcome” and that “Beijing did not interfere with election infrastructure.”

China did try to interfere with elections

The national intelligence officer for cyber at the time, Christopher Porter, assessed with others that the Chinese had indeed tried to undercut Trump in his reelection race.

“The National Intelligence Officer for Cyber assesses that China took at least some steps to undermine former President Trump’s reelection chances, primarily through social media and official public statements and media,” the ODNI assessment said of the “moderate confidence” assessment. “The NIO […] assesses that some of Beijing’s influence efforts were intended to at least indirectly affect U.S. candidates, political processes, and voter preferences, meeting the definition for election influence used in this report.”

“This view differs from the IC assessment because it gives more weight to indications that Beijing preferred former President Trump’s defeat and the election of a more predictable member of the establishment instead, and that Beijing implemented some — and later increased — its election influence efforts, especially over the summer of 2020,” the assessment concluded. “The NIO assesses these indications are more persuasive than other information indicating that China decided not to intervene.”

Continued…..