What the US can learn from South Koreans who stopped an authoritarian power-grab

This article What the US can learn from South Koreans who stopped an authoritarian power-grab was originally published by Waging Nonviolence.

As Elon Musk and his DOGE team set about dismantling government agencies, many Americans expected a strong response from Congressional Democrats. Instead, party leaders offered weak statements and little resistance to being refused entry to the very agencies they are tasked with overseeing.

This lack of urgency amid what’s being called an administrative coup stoked a wave of angry calls to “do more.” In their outrage on social media, many pointed to decisive action taken by politicians in other countries facing crisis. For example, someone on BlueSky noted that “South Korean politicians were literally scaling fences to protect their government,” while “our senators are sending out pre-scheduled tweets about the Super Bowl.”

South Korea is a particularly apt example in this context. After all, something incredible happened there two months ago, and it could be just the kind of inspiration Americans need to turn the tide on the Trump administration’s dangerous power-grab.

On Dec. 3, at 10:23 p.m., South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol unexpectedly declared nationwide martial law, citing the need to eliminate pro-North Korean elements and anti-state forces. He then established martial law command, mobilized troops and stripped citizens of their fundamental political and social rights. This included prohibiting all political activities by the National Assembly and political parties, control over all press and publication freedoms, a ban on strikes, slowdowns and assemblies, and the ability to arrest and detain anyone without judicial procedures or warrants.

The last time martial law was declared in South Korea was in 1979, following the assassination of then-President Park Chung-hee. However, what happened in December would be considered a self-coup — where an incumbent president takes actions to acquire or demand greater power while in office — and no South Korean president has done that since October 1972.

The martial law situation came to an abrupt end when the National Assembly passed a resolution demanding its withdrawal on Dec. 4 at 1:01 a.m. In response, martial law forces gradually withdrew from the National Assembly building. The Presidential Office announced the lifting of martial law at 4:26 a.m., and it was formally rescinded through a cabinet council resolution four minutes later, effectively terminating the entire episode within about six hours.

Subsequently, a nationwide movement demanding both the Yoon Suk Yeol administration’s resignation and comprehensive social reform was initiated. President Yoon is currently under detention and indictment while simultaneously facing impeachment proceedings. Many high-ranking officials from the Yoon administration have either resigned or been impeached, and numerous general-grade officers involved in the incident have been detained.

There were many reasons that the self-coup failed, including command confusion due to the extremely small number of personnel involved in planning the attempt. However, none of these factors could have halted the coup without civilian action. Here are four key lessons from this movement that contributed to their victory.

1. Take action commensurate with the threat and move quickly 

The South Korean Constitution explicitly states that when the majority of the National Assembly request that martial law be lifted the president must comply. After martial law was declared, civil society activists shared information about the police blockade of the National Assembly and the possibility of MPs being arrested, calling for people to gather at the Assembly.

As activists arrived, they began livestreaming the situation outside the assembly via social media. The opposition leader also initiated a livestream from his car while heading to the assembly, appealing to supporters to gather. Over 16,000 people assembled outside the assembly that night. They arrived before the martial law forces’ armored vehicles and helicopters, helping MPs scale the walls of the blockaded assembly building. Those who arrived by taxi reported that drivers didn’t accept the fare.

Elderly citizens stated they came thinking that they have lived long enough, and should take bullets instead of the young if the military opened fire. Young people reported standing in front of tanks with their bare hands, thinking that they wouldn’t actually shoot. They stood against armored vehicles and buses carrying martial law troops with nothing but their bodies, while recording and transmitting footage in real-time through social media. Most citizens who rushed to the assembly had no knowledge of nonviolent direct action or nonviolence training, yet instinctively grasped what was most crucial.

MPs weren’t the only ones scaling the assembly walls that night. Parliamentary aides and staffers also climbed over with citizens’ assistance. While citizens outside surrounded and blocked tanks, armored vehicles and buses, helicopters landed inside the assembly grounds. Parliamentary aides defended the main assembly building, constructing barricades with furniture at the entrances and using fire extinguishers to repel martial law forces who broke through windows. Assembly staffers prioritized protecting the generator, since modern parliamentary voting requires electricity. 

Ultimately, the martial law troops failed to occupy the main parliamentary chamber due to the resistance mounted by citizens, parliamentary security personnel and legislative staff, including lawmakers’ aides.

2. Encourage defections from security forces

A common testimony from citizens who confronted martial law forces that night was their open or subtle resistance to the coup attempt. They didn’t forcefully enter the National Assembly by actively repelling citizens gathered in front of the parliament and didn’t forcibly remove resisting aides from the assembly building. When they were ordered to seize the servers of the National Election Commission, they delayed by eating instant noodles at a nearby convenience store. And when the president’s arrest warrant was executed, Presidential Security Service officers either took leave or remained in standby areas, disobeying the Security Service chief’s orders, leading to the president’s arrest.

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There are many reasons that they acted this way. It partly stemmed from the military command’s secretive preparation and execution of the coup. The martial law troops reportedly did not know their destination until moments before boarding military helicopters, and none received proper briefings. The new generation of military personnel, raised after procedural democracy began taking root, also possesses more civic consciousness than their predecessors. They were capable of independently assessing that the situation by no means warranted martial law, and thus would have been less receptive to orders to mobilize force to stabilize social order under such circumstances. 

Ordinary citizens also actively encouraged soldiers to defect or not follow unlawful orders. Until the assembly passed the martial law termination, civil society organizations repeatedly issued statements appealing for disobedience from martial law forces. Citizens outside the assembly physically blocked martial law troops attempting to enter, tearfully appealing for disobedience with pleas to stop. They were urged to not commit crimes against the people by following unlawful orders. There were some citizens who were former special forces veterans, and they appealed for restraint by emphasizing their shared unit background. And lawyers’ group even distributed templates to the Security Service for them to justify refusing unjust orders.

3. Beware of the next martial law

Although the National Assembly passed a resolution demanding the lifting of martial law, it took approximately four hours until the president actually lifted it. During this time, people maintained their position in front of the National Assembly, preparing for the possibility that the president might reject the assembly’s demand. According to a government investigation that followed, President Yoon allegedly issued directives to “enter the National Assembly main chamber by force, including the use of firearms if necessary, to remove the members.” Furthermore, it was revealed that he instructed the military to “continue with the operation regardless of the martial law being lifted, as it could be declared two or three more times if needed.”

While the first coup attempt ended in failure after six hours, citizens remained anxious about the coup forces continuing to occupy key government positions. As soon as dawn broke on Dec. 4, civil society organizations across the country began issuing statements and holding press conferences throughout the day, demanding the president’s arrest, resignation and parliamentary impeachment.

The opposition party announced their intention to file criminal complaints against the president and the minister of defense for insurrection and to pursue impeachment. The secretary general of the National Assembly issued measures completely prohibiting the entry of Defense Ministry staff and police officers into the assembly building. Many opposition members of parliament, including the assembly speaker, stayed within the parliament building for about a week rather than returning home or to an official residence, preparing for contingencies such as abduction.

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Civil society organizations held large-scale daily protests in front of the National Assembly to protect the parliamentarians while simultaneously pressuring the assembly to swiftly pass the presidential impeachment motion. On Dec. 14, as the National Assembly passed the impeachment motion, over a million people turned out for the mass demonstration. They shifted from the National Assembly to the vicinity of the presidential residence and the Constitutional Court, continuing to demand the president’s arrest and urging the Constitutional Court to expedite its impeachment deliberations.

4. Create festive, diverse forms of resistance

As large-scale demonstrations continued daily in front of the National Assembly, organizing the crowds became the primary consideration. Notably, light sticks emerged as a new symbol of mass protest, replacing the traditional candlelight. While candlelight maintains a somewhat solemn atmosphere, light stick at the protests created an ambiance reminiscent of K-pop concerts, where they are often used by fans to cheer for their favorite idols. They created remarkable synergy at the protests when combined with hit songs that were sung as protest chants. (When the Jeju Air accident claimed 179 lives in late December, light sticks were temporarily replaced with candles as a gesture of mourning.)

This played a crucial role in attracting younger generations, who comprise the K-pop idol fanbase, to the rallies. Another characteristic feature of South Korean mass protests — food sharing — evolved significantly, with participants pre-paying for dozens or hundreds of cups of coffee, beverages, various snacks and meals at nearby cafes and restaurants, or sending coffee and snack trucks to protest sites. The rallies were basically structured like festivals, featuring various musicians and artists. Speeches were limited to two minutes each, with pre-registered free speech sessions, ensuring that participants had an opportunity to share their perspectives with the crowd.

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Many other groups participated. Unions for metal workers, railway workers and transport workers went on strike and held demonstrations at local ruling party offices and the offices of parliamentarians who refused to cooperate with the impeachment motion. History teachers created and distributed educational materials as teaching resources. The 34-page PowerPoint presentation distributed online was structured in four sections: the nature of martial law, historical cases of martial law in South Korea, problematic aspects of the Dec. 3 martial law declaration, and the creation of slogans for protests and collective actions. It was designed for immediate classroom implementation. The Korean Confederation of Trade Unions developed a website facilitating easy transmission of text messages to anti-impeachment parliamentarians, effectively rendering their mobile phones unusable due to the overwhelming volume of incoming messages.

Following the failure of this six-hour attempted self-coup, South Korean social movement organizations initially concentrated their efforts on pursuing presidential impeachment through the National Assembly, followed by demands for the president’s arrest. Currently, they are campaigning for the Constitutional Court to deliver a final verdict for the president’s dismissal. To this end, on Dec. 11, an umbrella organization called Emergency Action for Yoon Out and Social Reform was established by some 1,550 civil society groups.

South Korean social movements, drawing from their experience of successfully impeaching President Park Geun-hye just eight years ago, shared the assessment that their previous achievement was limited to merely shifting political power from conservatives to liberals. Therefore, this new umbrella organization set its objectives beyond the immediate resignation of the president. It’s aiming to establish the Seventh Republic of Korea that would achieve comprehensive social reforms through public discourse.

To achieve this, Emergency Action is conducting large-scale weekend demonstrations in front of the Constitutional Court while simultaneously operating 11 subcommittees composed of member organizations to design visions for social reform, develop reform proposals through deliberative processes and gather public opinion through discussions.

It is worth noting the role of the opposition party during the self-coup attempt. Parliamentary members who had military and National Intelligence Service backgrounds, and were previously considered conservative within the opposition party, played crucial roles. These members had easier access to internal information due to their existing networks. They had carefully observed the widespread appointment of the president’s private associates to key positions in the military and executive branch since the fall of 2024, interpreting these moves as preparations for declaring martial law.

Their intelligence capabilities enabled the opposition party to prepare for the possibility of martial law. In September, they had already proposed amendments to strengthen the requirements for declaring martial law. Moreover, opposition lawmakers had already agreed to gather at the National Assembly if necessary, which enabled them to move swiftly on the day martial law was declared and pass a resolution to lift it.

In South Korea, the prevention of a self-coup — which could have easily succeeded given the mobilization of martial law forces — was achieved through swift action based on identifying methods to lift martial law within the existing system. Had the coup succeeded that day, reversing the subsequent dictatorial situation would have been far more challenging.

The dangers of the moment are still real. Since the president’s arrest on Jan. 26, the situation has grown more complex with signs of far-right mobilization. South Korea has entered a prolonged struggle to strengthen its imperfect democracy, but its example should provide inspiration to all, including Americans, even as South Koreans work to defend and expand upon their recent victory.

This article What the US can learn from South Koreans who stopped an authoritarian power-grab was originally published by Waging Nonviolence.

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Source: https://wagingnonviolence.org/2025/02/lessons-from-south-koreans-who-stopped-martial-law-coup/