Criminal Referral Sent Against Unnamed IRS Agent

To: President and Commander in Chief Donald J. Trump

RE: IRS Employee #1486999999 Criminal Referral

Dear President Trump:

Bottom of Form

We received the attached IRS Notice in the mail today claiming we filed a “Frivolous Submission” for the tax year ending December 31, 2021. The claim “determined [from] the information we filed as a purported tax return, on December 21, 2022, is frivolous and there is no basis in the law for our position.”

First of all, we like so many Americans “voluntarily” file our taxes under concern of reprisal as failure to do so can result in civil penalties, interest, and criminal prosecution, including fines and imprisonment.

Second, we always file our tax returns on April 15th, so we don’t have any idea what they are claiming we filed on December 21, 2022. Therefore, we will not attempt to submit a copy of the 2022 Tax Forms to an unnamed individual who is acting in contradiction to the required oath of office, as doing so may provide evidence injurious to us through a blind submission.

Furthermore, the IRS tax return retention rules say, “Keep records for 3 years from the date you filed your original return or 2 years from the date you paid the tax, whichever is later, if you file a claim for credit or refund after you file your return.” We only needed to keep the records through tax year 2025 or as of the filing on April 15, 2026. So, the timing of this Notice is highly suspicious.

It is this suspicion that concerns us the most. From 2010 through 2015, I was investigating and reporting on Public Corruption, Child Sexual Abuse (CSA), Satanic Ritual Abuse (SRA), Human Trafficking, and the perpetrators involved, here in Northern Utah.  One of those perpetrators, in retaliation, filed a fraudulent 1099 with the IRS against me for $97,000, which took us almost four years to have it removed from our records.

In 2015, I was faced with violent opposition to the things I was investigating. There were multiple break-ins at the private office provided for me, the steering and brakes on my car were tampered with, and someone even loosened the lug nuts on one of the rear wheels hoping that the wheel would come off while I was driving. We also discovered that someone had spread poison around the outside my house and one belonging to one of my associates, then poison had been left only on the desk that I used in the office, which we discovered after I started having symptoms of poisoning, and I also received several voicemail threats of violence.

Then in December of 2015, the Community Support Foundation and I filed three Friend of the Court Briefs in the First District Court of Cache County Utah exposing corruption in the courts and community that involved Child Sexual Abuse (CSA), Satanic Ritual Abuse (SRA), Human Trafficking, and Public Corruption, with connections to the 1990 Glenn L. Pace Memorandum regarding Child Ritualist Abuse, False Prosecution, and the Convictions of Innocent Defendants and one case involved an ISIS Connection through Utah State University.

I appealed to the Utah State Attorney General (Sean Reyes) and the Utah State Bar Association for protection, when a perpetrator filed a small-claims-court action against me. Following the dismissal of the small-claims-court action, I met with the Section Chief over Special Prosecutions and Public Corruption, Nate Mutter, in the Utah State Attorney General’s office. In our two-hour meeting I gave Mutter copies of the Friend of the Court Briefs and our investigation findings, along with evidence of the threats to my life, and he listened to the voicemail threats made against me. During our discussion, Mutter told me that he had previously served as a police officer in Logan, Utah. I replied, “Then you know exactly what I am talking about.” Three weeks following our meeting, Mutter called and left me a voicemail saying, “We cannot pursue your claims because it would be a conflict of interest.” [WHAT?  - How does doing your job become a conflict of interest? Unless you are involved!] I called Mutter back and asked him who I should take my claims to? He told me to take it to the FBI. When I asked him to give me the name of someone at the FBI, he told me to just look it up for myself. Since I had already experienced an unfavorable situation with the FBI; I chose not to do anything at that time.

Then in January of 2018, I published American Crossroad of Trust highlighting the intentional destruction of the trust here in America, our trust in our personal safety, trust in our country’s security, and the trust in our leaders and the economy.

After US Attorney General Jeff Sessions had appointed US Attorney John Huber to investigate Hillary Clinton and the Clinton Foundation, to my detriment, I appealed to John Huber, for protection as a whistleblower. Seven months later, without any discussion or investigation, John Huber’s office filed a fictitious indictment against me for Securities Fraud in November of 2019. The Government’s star witness was none other than the SRA Victim, turned perpetrator, who now claimed that the small-claim-court action’s “failed collection of the loan” had become an investment in order for the government to indict me on a claim of Securities Fraud. Of course, a $5,500 claim isn’t very sexy, so the government manufactured a $600,000+ claim against me claiming that I had committed Securities Fraud against one of my best friends, who adamantly denied the allegations.

In January 2020, two years following the publishing of America Crossroad of Trust, John Huber announced his findings of his investigation into Hillary Clinton and the Clinton Foundation, claiming that there was nothing to see. You, Sir, responded by calling Huber a “human garbage disposal.”  

Unfortunately for Huber, American Crossroad of Trust exposed Huber’s act of treason and much of what he was supposed to be investigating (Rosatom/Uranium One, National Monuments, Benghazi and Hillary Clinton’s Email Server, CrowdStrike, the Russia Collusion Hoax and so much more) long before Huber said, “there was nothing to see.”

In October of 2021, shortly after reporting Military Intel about a Utah religious leader who was involved in Child Sex Trafficking in Argentina, and a husband and wife who were actively involved in Adrenochrome distribution, I was hospitalized with a diagnosis of COVID, intubated and given Remdesivir (90% kill rate) before being life-flighted to Intermountain Medical Center in Salt Lake City.

Every day that I was conscious, the nursing staff would ask me my name? What day it was? Where was I at, what kind of building was I in, and why was I here? I knew that if I did not answer the last question with COVID, that it would not be good for me, and they would think that I was delusional. So, every day for 31 days I answered, “COVID!” Then on the 31^st day, an hour before I was discharged to a rehabilitation facility, a respiratory therapist came into my room and gave me a full examination. When she was finished, she stepped behind my bed and I heard her call someone saying, “I don’t know how to fill out the COVID report, because he doesn’t match the symptoms.”  

When we applied for unemployment benefits, we soon discovered that about two to three weeks before I was hospitalized, someone had fraudulently filed an unemployment claim in my name, which prevented us from receiving unemployment benefits.

I survived but, after four years of a Kangaroo Court, I was found guilty of Securities Fraud by a jury that had been tampered with by instructions from the judge. I was sentenced to 28 months and sent to prison at Englewood FCI in Littleton Colorado in October of 2024. One week prior to my release in October of 2025, I received your letter to me acknowledging receipt of my communications with you.

My newest book, Santa’s tale of Jail – An insider’s view of the American Justice System reveals my story, and others, and much of the corruption I witnessed in the American Justice System. I now find myself inside of an interesting brotherhood with you and many of your advisors who share the label of “felon.” (Steve Bannon, Peter Navarro, Paul Manafort, George Papadopoulos, Michael Flynn, Roger Stone, Rick Gates, Allen Weisselberg, and others)

Enough is Enough!

So, here I am again facing another fraudulent accusation from the IRS, and it is time to put this hoax to rest.

My wife and I are a living, breathing, free man and woman, upon the free soil, American citizens of the American Republic, de jure private people who, by our inherent character in rerum natura, are foreign to and wholly without corporate ens legis United States are not subject to the actions, acts and whims of the ens legis Congress of the corporate UNITED STATES.  Accordingly, a living Man and Woman in rerum natura are not subject to the Federal Reserve Bank Act of December 23, 1913, which wants to force and effect of law in the Original Jurisdiction.

Under the Clearfield Doctrine, derived from the 1943 Supreme Court Decision in Clearfield Trust, et al. vs. United States, (328 U.S.363, 318), the court ruled, in essence, that when a government reduces itself to a corporate status, it becomes merely another corporation having no more or less standing that all corporations.

Furthermore, The United States Supreme Court in 2000 ruled, Bond vs. UNITED STATES 529 US 334-2000, which held that the people are in fact sovereign and not the STATES or government.  The court went on to define that local, STATE and FEDERAL law enforcement officers are committing unlawful actions against the Sovereign people by the enforcement of laws and are personally liable for their actions.

Not Everything is as it Appears!

However, the income tax was ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 1895. The Pollock decision held that a direct tax on income violated the constitutional requirement that direct taxes be apportioned among the states — a holding that stood for eighteen years until the Sixteenth Amendment, ratified in 1913, removed the apportionment requirement and cleared the legal path for the permanent federal income tax.

The official history of this sequence presents it as the democratic correction of an obstructionist judicial decision — the people, through the amendment process, overruling a court that had placed property rights above democratic fiscal governance. What the official history of this sequence does not present — because it exists not in the published record but in the account of a law clerk who worked for a federal circuit judge in the years immediately following the Sixteenth Amendment’s ratification and who gave a single extended account of his time in that position to a legal historian in 1962.

The judge was not a polemicist. He had ruled against income tax schemes on constitutional grounds in three cases during his circuit tenure, and his published opinions in those cases are careful, technically precise, and entirely within the mainstream of the Pollock-era jurisprudence that treated the apportionment requirement as a structural feature of the constitutional design rather than a technical inconvenience. What he told his clerk in private was not the reasoning he had published. It was the reasoning behind the reasoning — the institutional analysis of what a permanent, unportioned federal income tax would do to the relationship between the individual and the federal government that the constitutional structure had been designed to prevent, expressed in terms that his published opinions, which were written to be evaluated against legal precedent rather than political economy, had not been the appropriate venue for.

He told his clerk that the Pollock court had not been protecting wealth. It had been protecting the last structural mechanism by which the federal government’s claim on the individual remained bounded by a principle that required it to treat citizens as members of states rather than as units of a national population. And that what the Sixteenth Amendment had done was not expand democratic fiscal governance. It had completed a transformation of the relationship between the individual and the federal state that had begun, he believed, with the Seventeenth Amendment’s passage earlier that same year.

The clerk’s 1962 account is preserved in a legal history archive at a regional law school. It was collected as part of an oral history project documenting the recollections of individuals who had worked in the federal judiciary during the progressive era and is filed under the judge’s name in a collection that has been used by legal historians examining the Lochner era jurisprudence and has never been used, to the researcher’s knowledge who located it, by anyone examining what the judge said in private rather than what he wrote in his opinions.

This writing examines the clerk’s account alongside the judge’s published opinions, maps his private structural analysis against the documented evolution of the federal tax system in the fifty years following 1913, and builds the case that the last judicial voice to hold the constitutional line against the income tax understood what it represented with a clarity that neither its proponents nor its opponents in the public record were permitted or willing to state plainly.

In the spring of 1916, a man named Harlon Fisk Stone sat in his study late into the night reading a decision that had just come down from a federal circuit judge nobody had ever heard of. He read it once, then he read it again. Then he put it down on the desk, looked at the wall, and said something that his clerk would repeat for the rest of his life. He said, “If they let this stand, the whole thing unravels.”

They didn’t let it stand. The judge who wrote the decision was removed from the case within weeks. The opinion was buried. The man who argued it on behalf of the plaintiff disappeared from the legal record entirely. And the ruling, the last time in American history that a federal judge formally declared the income tax unconstitutional on grounds that had nothing to do with the 16^th amendment, was quietly expunged from the official report.

What happened in that courtroom in 1916 is not a footnote. It is the thread. Pull it and everything we think we know about the financial architecture of the modern world begins to come apart at the seam. To understand what happened in 1916, we have to understand what the world looked like in 1909. In 1909, the United States did not have a permanent federal income tax. It had tried twice, and twice the Supreme Court had ruled it unconstitutional.

The first time was in 1895 in a case called Pollock versus Farmers Loan and Trust Company. The court ruled five to four that a direct tax on income from property, rents, dividends, interest was a direct tax in the constitutional sense and direct taxes had to be apportioned among the states by population since the income tax wasn’t apportioned. It was unconstitutional. The decision was furious, divided, and immediately controversial. Critics called it the most destructive Supreme Court ruling since Dread Scott.

But here is what almost nobody talks about when they discuss Pollock. The lawyer who convinced five justices to kill the income tax was a man named Joseph Hodges Chot. And Chot in his oral argument said something extraordinary. He said the income tax was not merely a tax. It was a philosophical statement, the first step toward what he called a communist march on American property.

The justices who agreed with him weren’t just reading the Constitution. They were reading the architecture of a civilization. They believed that the relationship between a man and his earned wealth was not simply a legal arrangement. It was something older, something that predated the republic itself. Something that may have predated far more than that.

By 1909, the political pressure to reinstall the income tax was overwhelming. The progressive movement was in full force. Teddy Roosevelt had already served two terms and was agitating for economic reform. William Howard Taft was in the White House trying to hold the Republican party together with one hand while fending off populist fury with the other. Congress drafted the 16th amendment. It read, “The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes from whatever source derived without apportionment among the several states and without regard to any census or enumeration.” Short, clean, and devastating.

But there was a problem with ratification, and the problem was not small. The standard account says the 16th amendment was ratified on February 3rd, 1913, when Secretary of State Philander Knox certified that 38 states had approved it. 38 states, enough for three fourths of the 48 states in the union at the time. In 1984, however, a tax researcher named William Benson spent two years traveling to the archives of every state that had allegedly ratified the amendment. He came back with something that shook the small community of constitutional scholars who were paying attention. He came back with the original documents.

And what those documents showed, according to Benson’s analysis, was that the ratification process had been riddled with procedural errors, alterations, and in several cases, outright fraud. States that had rejected the amendment were counted as having ratified it. States that had passed different versions of the language were counted as having ratified the version sent by Congress. Kentucky ratified it after Congress had already certified it as law, which legally meant nothing. Minnesota never transmitted its ratification to the Secretary of State at all. Benson published his findings in a two-volume work called The Law That Never Was.

The federal government’s response was swift, total, and instructive. They did not refute his findings, document by document. They did not open the archives and show the American people where he was wrong. They prosecuted him for fraud and made it a federal crime to send his research through the mail to people who wanted to use it to challenge their tax liability. Think about that for a moment. The government’s answer to a man who said, “Show me where I’m wrong,” was to make it illegal to share his research.

There was another judge in 1916 whose name was Virgil Pritiman. And until very recently, finding any record of him at all required digging through county court archives in three different states. Pritiman was a federal district judge appointed by Woodrow Wilson in 1914. Not a fire brand, not a populist. His colleagues described him as methodical, careful, and deeply versed in property law and equity. In early 1916, a case came before his court that seemed to be on its surface routine. a businessman, the court records name him only as a plaintiff in a sealed equity proceeding, a fact that itself deserves attention, was challenging the assessment of income tax on earnings derived from a specific class of commercial activity. The details of that activity have been redacted from every version of the court record that is publicly accessible today. But what is not redacted is the legal theory that Pritiman used to analyze the case. Because Pritiman did not rule on the 16th amendment at all. He went further back. Pritiman’s decision, which ran to sixty-one pages in its original form, and which survives only in partial transcripts held in private collections began with a question that no federal judge had ever formally asked. He asked what is income? Not what does Congress say income is. Not what the Supreme Court said income is.

He asked the foundational question, what is income in the most fundamental legal and philosophical sense? What is the nature of the thing being taxed? And the answer he arrived at through an analysis of common law principles stretching back through English equity, through the Magna Carta, and through a set of legal precedents he cited as pre-colonial American commercial law was this income as a legal concept is not merely a measurement of accretion. It is not simply the money that comes in minus the money that goes out. Income in its original legal meaning is a measure of the productivity of something that already belongs to us. It is the fruit of property and the right to that fruit not just to hold it but to hold it unmolested by the sovereign was not created by the constitution. It predated the constitution. It was, Pritiman wrote about ancient inheritance. He used that phrase three times in the decision of ancient inheritance. He was not speaking metaphorically.

In building his argument about the pre-constitutional origins of income rights, he cited eleven specific legal precedents. Seven of them were standard English common law cases. The other four were different. The other four cited a body of law he referred to as the Continental Commercial Codes, which he attributed to what he called the unified administrative tradition of the pre-war western settlements. pre-war, not pre-revolutionary war, not pre- civil war, pre-war with no further specification. Scholars who have examined these citations have been unable to locate the original sources in any standard legal archive. Access to the full text requires going through channels that most academic institutions do not discuss openly.

One researcher writing in an obscured 1987 journal of legal history noted that two of the four citations appeared to reference administrative codes from what he called an organizational structure that does not correspond to any known colonial or territorial government in the historical record. He did not speculate further, but the implication was clear to anyone paying attention.

There are people in the historical community who have been saying for years that the legal architecture of the United States did not emerge fully formed from the minds of the founders that it was in significant part inherited adapted translated from an existing administrative framework that was already in place when the republic was constituted.

They were pre-existing systems absorbed, rebranded, and presented to the populations of the 19th century as new creations, and the people who built those new seeming institutions knew exactly what they were doing. If that is true, and the evidentiary case for it is more substantial than we have been allowed to know, then Pritiman’s citations make a different kind of sense entirely.

What if the pre-war western settlements he was citing were not a vague reference at all? What if he was citing with perfect precision the administrative codes of a prior civilization whose property law had never been officially superseded, only buried? What if the income tax violated a framework of property rights so ancient that its origins had been deliberately obscured from the populations it governed? What if the entire modern taxation apparatus was not an extension of American law but a replacement of something older?

Harlon Fisk Stone reading that decision in his study in 1916 said, “if they let this stand the whole thing unravels.” He was right but not for the reasons legal historians have assumed.

Let us return to Judge Pritiman and to what happened after. The decision was handed down in March of 1916. Within ten days, the Justice Department had filed an emergency appeal. Within three weeks, the case had been transferred out of Pritiman’s court by a procedural mechanism that legal historians have described as unusual, but not unprecedented. Within six weeks, Pritiman himself had submitted his resignation from the federal bench. His resignation letter held in the National Archives gives no reason. He was 51 years old, in good health, on the bench for less than two years. He resigned, moved to a small town in Western Virginia, and never practiced law again. He died in 1931. His obituary in the local paper does not mention his judicial service at all.

The clerk who was present when Stone read the decision was Edward Creel. He gave one interview in 1958 to a retired journalist named Marcus Holland who was writing a private memoir about the early years of the federal income tax. That memoir was never published, but pages from it have circulated in the legal history underground for decades. In that interview, Creel said Stone had read the decision in its entirety, then called Creel in and read him one passage aloud, the passage concerning the ancient inheritance argument and the citations to the Continental Commercial Codes. And that Stone had said, putting the document down, if they let this stand, the whole thing unravels.

The codes he’s citing, if those hold, the tax is not merely unconstitutional. It’s void. It was always void. There was never a legal basis for it that didn’t depend on suppressing what came before. Creel was asked what Stone meant by what came before. He said he didn’t know. He said Stone didn’t explain it. He said Stone simply handed him the document, told him to file it under seal, and walked out of the room. The document has never appeared in any public archive.

By 1916, the income tax was barely three years old. But it was already the financial spine of something much larger. It was the mechanism that made the Federal Reserve system created in December 1913, ten months after the 16^th Amendment was certified financially viable as a permanent institution. Without a reliable stream of income tax revenue pledged as collateral, the Federal Reserve’s ability to issue currency backed by government debt was fundamentally compromised. The income tax and the Federal Reserve were not separate innovations. They were collectively one.

Components of a single system installed within ten months of each other designed to interlock. If the income tax was void from inception because it violated a pre-existing framework of property rights that had never been legally extinguished, then the collateral basis of the Federal Reserve was also void. And every dollar issued against that collateral was issued against nothing. This is what Stone meant when he said the whole thing unravels. He was not talking about a tax ruling. He was talking about the monetary system of the 20th century. The continental commercial codes that Pritiman referenced were according to the researcher who analyzed them most closely characterized by three things that distinguished them from the English common law tradition.

First, property rights in those codes were not alienable by taxation. The fruit of property belonged absolutely to the property holder, not as a grant from the sovereign, not as a privilege extended by the state, as an original pre-political right.

Second, the codes contained explicit provisions forbidding the use of privately issued debt instruments as a general medium of exchange. Currency was a public utility issued by a civic authority accountable to the community it served. It could not be issued by a private corporation and lent into existence at interest.

Third, and this is the one that stops us cold, the codes contain provisions stating that no subsequent legal framework could extinguish the rights they described without the explicit, informed, documented consent of every individual whose rights were affected. Not a majority, not a legislature, every individual. which meant in Pritiman’s analysis that no constitutional amendment could extinguish the property rights those codes described because the people whose rights were being extinguished had never been told those rights existed. They had been kept from knowing. The income tax was not in this analysis merely an unconstitutional tax.

It was a theft conducted on a population deliberately kept ignorant of what was being taken from them. ignorant not just of their legal rights but of the entire prior civilization whose administrative framework those rights were embedded in.

 If Pritiman was right, the income tax was void for the same reason a contract is void when one party conceals material information from the other. The American people had entered into an arrangement without knowing what they were giving up, without knowing that the thing being taken from them had been recognized and protected by a legal system far older than the one they believed they were living under. This is the argument that Stone said, if allowed to stand would unravel everything, and it nearly did because Pritiman was not alone.

There is a name that appears twice in the surviving fragments of the 1916 case record. Victor Rosewater. He was not a lawyer. He was a journalist, editor of the Omaha Bee and according to his private correspondence held at the Nebraska State Historical Society, he was aware of Pritiman’s decision before it was handed down.

In a letter dated two weeks before the decision was issued, Rosewater wrote to a colleague in Washington, “The judge in the Virginia District has found the thread. If his reasoning is allowed to circulate, we will see the entire newspaper establishment turn on him within a week of publication. The people who built 1913 will not allow a circuit judge to undo it.” He was right about the timeline. He was right about the reaction. He was wrong about one thing. It wasn’t the newspapers that buried Pritiman’s decision.

By the time they might have covered it, the decision had already been sealed. The process happened from inside the legal apparatus itself faster than the press could respond. The question of who made that happen leads to a name anyone familiar with the history of the Federal Reserve will recognize. Paul Warberg. Warberg was the single most important architect of the Federal Reserve Act. the man who at the secret Jackal Island meeting in 1910 drafted the core provisions of what would become the central bank of the United States. He was a member of the Khun Lobe banking family whose operations stretched back through the German banking houses of the 18th century and into the financial networks of the old continental trading cities where the commercial codes were.

Pritiman found the thread not because he was a researcher or a conspiracy theorist, but because he was a lawyer who took the question, “What is income?” seriously enough to trace it all the way back. And what he found was a body of law that predated the republic, a framework of human economic relationships that had been functioning, documented, and suppressed for longer than the official history of the United States had been running.

His clerk Edward Creel was asked in that 1958 interview whether he had ever understood the full implications of what Stone said that night. Creel said he had spent forty years thinking about it. He said the line that stayed with him was not the whole thing unravels. That was the famous line. Everyone who knew the story remembered that line. The line that stayed with him was the one Stone said before it.

Stone had looked at the four citations to the Continental Commercial Codes. He had looked at them for a long time. And then he said quietly to no one in particular, “These are real.” He actually found them. These are real codes from a real system. And then if they let this stand, the whole thing unravels. Not anger, not alarm, just the flat still voice of a man who has seen something he cannot unsee. These are real codes from a real system. A real administrative system with real commercial codes that had governed real people and real property transactions whose property law was incompatible with the income tax, the Federal Reserve, and the entire financial architecture of the 20th century.

A system erased so thoroughly that a federal judge working from fragments nobody was supposed to be examining was the first person in the history of the American legal profession to formally cite it in a federal court ruling and who was then removed from his bench and who then resigned from the law entirely and who then vanished from the record as completely as the civilization whose codes he had cited.

The four anomalous citations reference specific volumes and page numbers. Researchers who traced those references found they do not appear in the Library of Congress catalog, the Harvard Law Library, or any major legal archive in the United States. They do appear in fragmentary form in two places.

The first is the collection of a private legal society in Philadelphia called the law library of the Aanam of Philadelphia which maintains a closed collection of pre-revolutionary legal materials accessible only to members. Requests to examine that collection have been declined consistently since at least the 1970s.

The second is a set of institutional archives in Europe in the collection of a charitable foundation based in Basil, Switzerland whose stated mission is the preservation of premodern European administrative documents. The foundation was established in 1921. Its founding donors included members of the Warberg banking family. The same family whose most prominent American member had five years earlier orchestrated the removal of the only federal court decision that had ever cited those documents.

The archives containing the evidence of what was lost are controlled by the family of the man who ensured the evidence would never be used again. This is not a conspiracy theory. This is a documented chain of custody. The documents are in Basel, controlled by a foundation with ties to the Federal Reserve’s founding family, and they have been inaccessible to independent researchers for over a century.

The legal theory that Pritiman articulated did not disappear with his resignation. It went underground, passed from researcher to researcher through the legal history underground that exists in every era when the official record becomes too obviously incomplete.

It surfaced again in 1984 when William Benson published his work on the ratification fraud. His methodology was different, working from the amendment’s procedural history rather than the deeper property rights theory, but the conclusion was the same. The tax had no valid legal basis.

It surfaced again in the 1990s when legal theorists began examining the distinction between the United States as a constitutional republic and the United States as a federal municipal corporation. This was not fringe material. It was published in academic journals drawing on the rarely discussed fact that the District of Columbia Organic Act of 1871 created a corporate entity legally distinct from the republic established by the Constitution.

If the entity collecting the income tax is a private municipal corporation, then the legal basis for the tax is not the 16th Amendment. It is a private contractual arrangement that depends for its validity on informed consent. Consent that was never obtained. Consent that could not be obtained because obtaining it would have required disclosing what the arrangement was replacing.

It is all there. What has been missing is the legal thread, the specific documentable point at which the prior civilization’s administrative framework intersected with the current civilization’s legal architecture. Pritiman found that thread in 1916. It led him somewhere he was not allowed to take a courtroom. But the thread is still there. The codes still exist. The foundation in Basil still holds them. The chain of custody is documented. And the family that controls the archives is the same family that buried the ruling. Once we find a thread and understand what it connects, it is very difficult to lose it.

Again, because now we know what to look for. The income tax is not simply a constitutional question. The Federal Reserve is not simply a monetary question. The legal architecture of the modern state is not a natural evolution of human civilization’s understanding of justice and property. It is a replacement, a deliberate, generationally maintained replacement of something whose codes described a world in which the fruit of our labor belongs to us. Absolutely. In which currency was a public utility and not a private debt instrument, in which no subsequent legal framework could extinguish our rights without our informed consent. A world that the people who built 1913 needed us to forget had existed.

Judge Pritiman found it. Stone knew what it meant. Warberg made sure it never saw a courtroom again. And then the judge resigned from the law, moved to a small town in Western Virginia, and never spoke about it publicly for the remaining 15 years of his life. But as his Clerk remembered, a journalist named Holland wrote it down. And pages from that unfinished memoir have been circulating for 60 years among the people who understand what they mean.

And now we know. The decision is real. The codes are real. The suppression is real. The family that controls the archives is real. The connection between those archives and the creation of the Federal Reserve is real. The only question left is what we do with a thread once we have found it.

The answer historically has been that the people who pull it are removed from the rooms where it matters. Pritiman was removed. Benson was prosecuted. Researchers who tried to access the ANAM collection were declined. The system is very good at removing people from rooms. What it has never been good at in any era in any civilization, including the ones it replaced, is keeping the thread from being found again. Because the thread does not disappear when the person holding it, is removed from the room. It was there before Pritiman. It is woven into the citations of sixty-one-page decision that only partially survives into the private correspondence of a journalist who knew what was coming into the sealed memoir of a clerk who spent forty years thinking about one sentence spoken in a quiet study in 1916.

These are real codes from a real system. Stone said it. Stone knew what it meant. And somewhere in a foundation archive in Basil, Switzerland, controlled by the heirs of the man who buried the ruling, the original volumes are still sitting on a shelf, waiting for the next judge willing to cite them, waiting for the next courtroom willing to hear it, waiting for the moment when enough people understand what was taken from them that the concealment becomes impossible to maintain. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AIdkOtxD6rA

This is exactly why the story of Judge Pritiman and the decision that Stone said would unravel everything is a story we were never supposed to hear. The reality of this information is evidence of the greatest fraud ever perpetrated against this nation and the American people. 

Violation of Oath of Office

The Constitution requires that government officials must take an oath of office to support the Constitution before assuming office. In order to comply with the Constitution, Congress has enacted federal laws to execute and enforce this constitutional requirement.

Federal law regulating oath of office by government officials is divided into four parts along with an executive order which further defines the law for purposes of enforcement. 5 U.S.C. 3331, provides the text of the actual oath of office employees of the United States Government are required to take before assuming office. 5 U.S.C. 3333 requires employees of the United States Government sign an affidavit that they have taken the oath of office required by 5 U.S.C. 3331 and have not or will not violate that oath of office during their tenure of office as defined by the third part of the law, 5 U.S.C. 7311 which explicitly makes it a federal criminal offense (and a violation of oath of office) for anyone employed in the United States Government  to “advocate the overthrow of our constitutional form of government”. The fourth federal law, 18 U.S.C. 1918 provides penalties for violation of oath office described in 5 U.S.C. 7311 which include: (1) removal from office and; (2) confinement or a fine.

The definition of “advocate” is further specified in Executive Order 10450 which for the purposes of enforcement supplements 5 U.S.C. 7311. One provision of Executive Order 10450 specifies it is a violation of 5 U.S.C. 7311 for any person taking the oath of office to advocate “the alteration … of the form of the government of the United States by unconstitutional means.” Our form of government is defined by the Constitution of the United States. It can only be “altered” by constitutional amendment. Thus, according to Executive Order 10450 (and therefore 5 U.S. 7311) any act taken by government officials who have taken the oath of office prescribed by 5 U.S.C. 3331which alters the form of government other by amendment, is a criminal violation of the 5 U.S.C. 7311. – See Walker vs Members of Congress https://www.foavc.org/01page/Articles/Violation%20of%20Oath%20of%20Office%20and%20Walker%20v%20Members%20of%20Congress.htm

“Any judge [employee of the United States] who does not comply with his/her oath to the United States wars against that Constitution and engages in acts in violation of the supreme law of the land. The judge [employee of the United States] is engaged in acts of treason.” Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 78 S. Ct. 1401 (1958)

18 U.S. Code § 2381 – Treason:

Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States, levies war against them or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the United States or elsewhere, is guilty of treason and shall suffer death, or shall be imprisoned not less than five years and fined under this title but not less than $10,000; and shall be incapable of holding office under the United States.

18 U.S. Code § 4 – Misprision of Felony:

Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony cognizable by a court of the United States, conceals and does not as soon as possible make known the same to some judge or other person in civil or military authority under the United States, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 684; Pub. L. 103–322, title XXXIII, § 330016(1)(G), Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 2147.)

18 U.S. Code § 2382 – Misprision of Treason:

Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States and having knowledge of the commission of any treason against them, conceals and does not, as soon as may be, disclose and make known the same to the President or to some judge of the United States, or to the governor or to some judge or justice of a particular State, is guilty of misprision of treason and shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than seven years, or both.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 807; Pub. L. 103–322, title XXXIII, § 330016(1)(H), Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 2147.)

There has been ample evidence in the information presented herein to show that the claims of commission of a felony, violations of the Oath of Office, Treason, and Crimes Against Citizens of the United States, have plausible merit.

The violation of one’s oath of office is an act of treason and anyone having knowledge of the commission of treason, who conceals or does not, as soon as possible, disclose and make known the same is guilty of misprision of treason.

It is the duty of every good citizen, knowing of a treason or felony having been committed; to inform a magistrate. Silently to observe the commission of a felony, without using any endeavors to apprehend the offender, is a misprision.” 1 Russ.on Cr. 43; Hawk. P. C. c. 59, s. 6; Id. Book 1, c. s. 1; 4 Bl. Com. 119. You are hereby officially notified of these crimes by the undersigned “good citizen.”

Therefore, it is incumbent upon you, as the Commander in Chief and the Executive Officer over the Courts and Servants of We the People, to bring this out into the light of day and expeditiously restore law and order to the nation. 

This presentation shall serve as Notice of Misprision of Treason pursuant to 28 U.S.C Section 1746 and as a Criminal Referral for Correction because I am concerned the courts and public officials have been making decisions that constitute a national security breach.

Therefore, I ask that you stand against the invasion and influence of foreign and domestic enemies and uphold the Supreme Law of the Land by granting relief from this oppression. Your Oath of Office demands it, and I pray that you will honorably uphold the Constitution of the United States in the performance of your duty.

Respectfully,                                                  

Thomas H. Fairbanks