What’s (State-Funded) Russian Media Saying About Syria’s Regime Change?

Authored by Andrew Korybko via substack,

Publicly financed Russian media’s reaction to Syria’s regime change is a lot different than most could have expected after they earlier warned that this could lead to an unprecedented terrorist crisis.

Those concerns were warranted since Turkish-backed Harat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) is designated as a terrorist group and was originally part of Al Qaeda. Nevertheless, these outlets’ reactions have been surprisingly calm, thus suggesting a desire to play everything by ear for the sake of retaining Russian influence there.

RT published two very thought-provoking op-eds since the Syrian Arab Army’s (SAA) epic collapse and Assad’s cowardly flight from Damascus that are worth reviewing in this context. The first is by Murad Sadygzade, who’s President of the Middle East Studies Center and Visiting Lecturer at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow, and answers the question of “Why did Syria fall so fast and what happens next?” He began by drawing attention to foreign meddling but then dove into domestic details.

This approach is noteworthy since it had hitherto been very rare for publicly financed Russian media to talk about the Assad Government’s many shortcomings, but Sadygzade candidly addressed them:

“A key turning point came when Assad lost the support of even those who had stood by him for years. Economic hardships, sanctions, and a growing sense of hopelessness led many to believe that change was inevitable, even if it came at the cost of destruction. The strategic mistake of the ruling elite – betting on a military solution to the conflict while ignoring political dialogue, both domestically and internationally – ultimately left Assad vulnerable to determined and well-organized adversaries.”

The second RT op-ed is a republication of an article by Gazeta.ru political analyst Vitaly Ryumshin under the title “Assad’s collapse was coming – everyone just looked away”. Here are the highlights:

“Assad’s Syria had been rotting from within for years. The country was locked in a perpetual humanitarian and economic crisis, with 90% of Syrians living in poverty and widespread malnutrition. Desperate families took out loans just to buy food but couldn’t pay them back. Power outages crippled even Damascus, sometimes leaving the capital dark for 20 hours a day. Electricity prices soared by up to 585% in the spring of 2024 alone, pushing an already destitute population deeper into despair.

The Assad government offered no solutions – only mounting repression. Under crushing sanctions, Damascus couldn’t secure foreign loans, and with its oil fields under US-Kurdish control, there was nothing left to trade. Even Syria’s illicit drug trade, once a lifeline, couldn’t plug the gaping holes in state finances. Profits disappeared into the pockets of warlords and traffickers, not the state treasury.

Meanwhile, Assad’s underpaid, demoralized army, bled dry by years of civil war, continued to disintegrate. For a time, Iranian proxies like Hezbollah propped up his forces, but by 2024, they’d shifted their attention to fighting Israel. Attempts to draw Russia further into Syria’s quagmire fell flat. Moscow, busy elsewhere, had no interest in bailing Assad out.”

Ryumshin also twice referred to the Assad Government as a “regime” in back-to-back sentences, writing that “In the south and southeast, dormant rebel cells rose up, striking a final blow against Assad’s hollowed-out regime. On Sunday, opposition forces stormed Damascus from several directions. Bashar al-Assad, whose regime withstood over a decade of civil war, finally fell from power.” It’s a stunning change in RT’s editorial policy that they didn’t replace that previously taboo word before republishing.

Perhaps they listened to what their senior correspondent and veteran Syrian War journalist Murad Gazdiev told them in an interview, where he concluded that “Assad’s govt fell due to corruption, lack of organization, and motivation”. He has a decade worth of experience covering this conflict so his post-mortem on Assad’s Government should be taken very seriously. Publicly financed TASS also editorialized the word “regime” into a headline about Syria on Tuesday in a related visible change of policy.

The day prior, they described HTS’ chief as an “armed opposition leader” without referencing the US’ $10 million bounty on his head for terrorist-related crimes or even his connection to such groups. TASS also reported how “Syrian Embassy operating as usual under new flag”, which implies Moscow’s tacit (key qualifier) acceptance of this regime change in the sense of continuing to recognize those Syrian diplomats as official representatives of the new ruling arrangement who are allowed to keep working.

Their press review of Vedomosti’s article about the future of Russia’s military bases in Syria adds context to why that tacit acceptance appears to have been made. Ibragim Ibragimov, a researcher at the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute of World Economy and International Relations, told them that “I don’t exclude that a new format of military-technical cooperation will appear soon and that Russian military instructors will play a role in establishing a new Syrian army.” That would be an intriguing turn of events.

It might not be as far-fetched as some think provided that there’s political will and the right conditions to make it work, the latter of which would require the non-terrorist anti-government opposition (NTAGO) to separate itself from terrorist-designated groups and figures. Moreover, such groups and figures would have to prove that they’ve changed their ways, just like the Taliban have sought to do since returning to power in mid-2021 to regain Russia’s trust and try to have restrictions on cooperation with them lifted.

To that end, meaningful progress on implementing UNSC Resolution 2254 from December 2015 would go a long way, which Assad refused to do for reasons beyond the scope of this analysis. The Russian-written draft constitution that was unveiled during the first Astana Summit in January 2017 could also be revived to serve as a model for the constitutional reform that this resolution obligates Syria to undertake. Assad had unofficially rubbished it due to the concessions that he was asked to make.

Judging by what the head of the Syrian armed opposition delegation to the Astana talks told Sputnik and the president of the Syrian Negotiation Commission told RT, these two internationally recognized NTAGO platforms want to retain positive relations with Russia. That could explain why the leader of the new interim Syrian government, Mohammed al-Bashir, was described by TASS as someone who “joined anti-government armed units supported by foreign funding” instead of the previously typical foreign proxy.

Reflecting on publicly financed Russian media’s reports about Syria’s regime change, it therefore appears as though the Kremlin signaled to those outlets within its “sphere of influence” to withhold publishing worst-case scenario forecasts for now while their country’s diplomats try to avert an even worse crisis. The worst might still be yet to come, but it hasn’t yet unfolded and might still be prevented, hence the importance of them remaining calm and reciprocating the new ruling arrangement’s positive messages.