Russia’s Arrival In Dnipropetrovsk Puts Ukraine In A Dilemma

Authored by Andrew Korybko via Substack,

It’s very difficult to imagine how Ukraine can prevent any further Russian advances after this…

The Russian Ministry of Defense announced on Sunday that their forces had entered Ukraine’s Dnipropetrovsk Region, which Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov confirmed is part of Putin’s buffer zone plan. This was foreseen as early as late August once the Battle of Pokrovsk began but has been achieved even without capturing that strategic fortress town. Russian forces simply went around it after breaking through the southern Donbass front. This development puts Ukraine in a dilemma.

It’ll now have to simultaneously fortify the Dnipropetrovsk front together with the southern Kharkov and northern Zaporozhye ones in case Russia uses its new position to launch offensives into any of those three. This could put serious strain on the Ukrainian Armed Forces as they’re already struggling to prevent a major breakthrough in Sumy Region from Kursk. Coupled with depleting manpower and questions about continued US military-intelligence aid, this might be enough to collapse the frontlines.

To be sure, that scenario has been bandied about many times over the past more than 1,200 days, but it nowadays appears tantalizingly closer than ever. Observers also shouldn’t forget that Putin told Trump that he’ll respond to Ukraine’s strategic drone strikes earlier this month, which could combine with the abovementioned two factors to achieve this long-desired breakthrough. Of course, it might just be a symbolic demonstration of force, but it could also be something more significant as well.

Ukraine’s best chances of preventing this are for the US to either get Russia to agree to freeze the frontlines or to go on another offensive.

The first possibility could be advanced by the carrot-and-stick approach of proposing a better resource-centric strategic partnership than has already been offered in exchange on pain of imposing crippling secondary sanctions on its energy clients (specifically China and India with likely waivers for the EU) and/or doubling down on military-intelligence aid if it still refuses.

As for the second, the 120,000 troops that Ukraine has assembled along the Belarusian border according to President Alexander Lukashenko last summer could either cross that frontier and/or one of Russia’s internationally recognized frontiers. Objectively speaking, however, both possibilities only stand a slim chance of success: Russia has made it clear that it must achieve more of its goals in the conflict before agreeing to any ceasefire while its success in pushing Ukraine out of Kursk bodes ill for other invasions.

The likelihood of Ukraine cutting its losses by agreeing to more of Russia’s demands for peace is nil. Therefore, it might inevitably opt, whether in lieu of the aforesaid scenarios or in parallel with one or both of them, to intensify its “unconventional operations” against Russia. This refers to assassinations, strategic drone strikes, and terrorism. All that will do, however, is provoke more (probably outsized) conventional retaliation from Russia and thus painfully delay Ukraine’s seemingly inevitable defeat.

With an eye towards the endgame, it appears as though an inflection point is about to be reached or already has been in the sense of irreversibly shifting the military-strategic dynamics in Russia’s favor. It’s very difficult to imagine how Ukraine can extricate itself from this dilemma. All signs point to this being impossible, though the conflict has already surprised observers on both sides before, so it can’t be ruled out. Nevertheless, it’s a far-fetched scenario, and it’s more likely that Ukraine’s official defeat is nigh.