Egypt’s Tahrir Square revolution ripped open political and social divisions that were nailed down for decades by authoritarian rule. Two years of democratically elected government have only deepened the rifts and the results have spilled into the streets. 

On Monday at least 51 killed and more than 436 people wounded in clashes between security forces and supporters of ousted President Mohammed Morsi.

The shootings began during a protest by about 1,000 Islamists outside the Republican Guard headquarters where Morsi, Egypt’s first freely elected leader, was detained last week. Morsi’s Muslim Brotherhood called for an uprising, accusing troops of gunning down protesters, while the military blamed armed Islamists for provoking its forces.

The interim president drove ahead with the army’s political plan after the bloodshed. He issued a swift timetable for the process of amending the Islamist-backed constitution and set parliamentary and presidential elections for early 2014. But ultra-conservative Salafi party Al-Nour, furious over what it saw as a “massacre” against Islamists, pulled out of talks to choose a new prime minister — pushing the country closer to the brink of a political crisis.

“There’s nothing clear-cut about Egypt’s divisions,” said Sahar Aziz of Texas Wesleyan University in an interview from Cairo. “Whole families are divided on a number of issues. You can’t say it’s class, or poverty, or even religion. The majority of people are very critical of Morsi. The differences are over what to do about it.”

One clear divide, however, is between Egypt’s burgeoning urban population and the 42 per cent who live in the rural areas.

In the 2012 presidential elections, says Hani Shakrallah, a former editor of the online news service, “overall the revolution won the great cities of the country while rural Egypt was split — literally down the middle — between the military’s candidate, Ahmed Shafiq, and the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohammed Morsi.”

That may be changing. Last month Washington-based pollster James Zogby  of the Arab American Institute found that even in rural Upper Egypt and the agricultural areas, only about 37 per cent felt themselves better off than they were five years ago. There was also a split between people who valued a “secular and inclusive culture,” and those who preferred stronger adherence to tradition and religion, he said.

Although the West views the religious division as between secular and devout Egyptians, Geneive Abdo says there are new and worrying rifts among Islamic groups.

“The secular-oriented population is in the minority,” said Abdo, a fellow of the Stimson Center’s Middle East program. “People who told me they were against the Brotherhood didn’t say they were against Islam — they supported Al-Nour.”

The hardline Al-Nour is not the only competition for the once popular Brotherhood, she said. “There are 16 parties of Islamists that have sprung up since the revolution.” As in other Arab countries, hardliners have gained ground gradually but resolutely.

The Brotherhood’s most determined foe is Egypt’s large and powerful military, still the most trusted institution but one that lost support as violence broke out. But both sides will have to navigate the dangerous gap between them or face clashes that could paralyze the country or drive it into a spiral of violence.

“The Brotherhood feels like it’s been robbed,” says Shibley Telhami of the University of Maryland, author ofthe world through the eyes of an Arab.. “But as the transition moves forward, there will be parliamentary elections and their supporters will have to make a decision on how they want to influence politics from now on.”

The army, on the other hand, “can’t decide whether it wants to come back and control things, or protect its own sphere of influence and not govern any more. Their confrontations, their clampdown on the press, have given people pause. There is a red line between a revolution and a coup.”

The opposition, too, is divided, with a number of factions and no clear leader, although former UN atomic watchdog Mohamed ElBaredei is mooted as a candidate.

But with all the splits in the Egyptian political landscape, one thing is clear, says Zogby: “The option that wins hands down is that all groups want a real national dialogue.”

“The public no longer wants to accept military, religious or secular dictators,” says Telhami. “They won’t put up with them any more. But from left to right, they are all terrified of the prospect of civil war or a failed state. They want to avert that — but they may not be able to control it.”