Sealing, COVID, and the Fed (Well, the Minneapolis Branch)

From Judge Eric Tostrud (D. Minn.) last week in Maki v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Minneapolis:

On May 21, 2025, the Court docketed an Opinion and Order resolving motions to exclude expert testimony and for summary judgment. [It's available here. -EV] On May 27, Defendant Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis moved to seal the Opinion and Order. The Bank “seeks to keep confidential three narrow categories of information: (1) details regarding law enforcement shifts and staffing at the Bank, (2) references to staffing of security posts at the Bank, and (3) discussion of modifications to the Bank’s security protocols during the COVID-19 pandemic.”

In the Bank’s view, “there are compelling national security and safety reasons” that justify preventing public “disclosure of information that could provide insights and impressions about the Bank’s security, regardless of whether the information is about currently-in-force protocols.” If its motion is granted, the Bank proposes to “submit a confidential copy of the Order with the confidential portions marked for the Court’s review.” If the Court approves of the proposed redactions, then the Bank proposes that the Opinion and Order be republished with the redactions….

“[T]he courts of this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and documents.” “This right of access bolsters public confidence in the judicial system by allowing citizens to evaluate the reasonableness and fairness of judicial proceedings, and to keep a watchful eye on the workings of public agencies.” “It also provides a measure of accountability to the public at large, which pays for the courts.” … When it attaches, a court must decide “whether there [are] sufficient grounds to override the common-law right of access” that justify sealing the judicial record ….

The Bank’s motion will be denied. (1) The information subject to the Bank’s motion was material and important to the decision denying the parties’ competing summary-judgment motions. It figured centrally in deciding whether the Bank could accommodate Mr. Maki’s religious objections to the Bank’s COVID-19 vaccination policy without incurring undue hardship. Put another way, the rationale underlying the accommodation and undue-hardship analysis cannot realistically be understood without accessing this information.

{To recap, the Bank sought summary judgment on the ground that no staffing rearrangement could relieve Mr. Maki of his duties without an undue hardship. And the Bank opposed Mr. Maki’s summary-judgment motion, in which Mr. Maki argued that that assigning him to a particular position at a particular time would not substantially increase the Bank’s costs. These arguments relied on numerous facts about the Bank’s staffing procedures, including the timing and number of officers’ shifts. The parties’ summary-judgment motions were denied (with respect to the Title VII claim) in large part because of factual disputes regarding whether Mr. Maki could maintain social distance on the job, whether a post or shift reassignment could have reduced his contact with other individuals, whether voluntary shift-swapping was possible, whether rearranging the scheduling and staffing system was costly, and whether all officer posts and shifts required Mr. Maki to maintain his core duties.}

(2) The Bank’s national-security and safety concerns are not clear or described specifically. How the Bank chose to staff security checkpoints—that is, the basic procedures the Bank followed, the equipment used to conduct screening, and the number of security personnel at each location—were visible to any member of the public who might have entered the Bank. If the Bank employed security procedures that were not publicly visible—like, for example, the “criteria that the TSA considers when assessing whether passengers should be subjected to additional screening” that the court addressed in [an earlier case]—the Bank has not identified them. Nothing like that was described or discussed in deciding the parties’ summary-judgment motions.

(3) If knowledge of the Bank’s COVID-19-era security protocols might have threatened its security, that was in the past. The Bank has not explained how knowledge of those past protocols might threaten its security today or in the future.

(4) Information the Bank seeks to seal was discussed during the hearing on the parties’ motions. The hearing was public. No request was made to close the courtroom. The hearing’s public nature confirms this information’s non-seal-worthy character.

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