Nuclear electricity generation has hidden problems; don’t expect advanced modular units to solve them.

It is easy to get the impression that proposed new modular nuclear generating units will solve the problems of nuclear generation. Perhaps they will allow more nuclear electricity to be generated at a low cost and with much less of a problem with spent fuel.

As I analyze the situation, however, the problems associated with nuclear electricity generation are more complex and immediate than most people perceive. My analysis shows that the world is already dealing with “not enough uranium from mines to go around.” In particular, US production of uranium “peaked”about 1980 (Figure 1).

For many years, the US was able to down-blend nuclear warheads (both purchased from Russia and from its own supply) to get around its uranium supply deficit.

Today, the inventory of nuclear warheads has dropped quite low. There are few warheads available for down-blending. This is creating a limit on uranium supply that is only now starting to hit.

Nuclear warheads, besides providing uranium in general, are important for the fact that they provide a concentrated source of uranium-235, which is the isotope of uranium that can sustain a nuclear reaction. With the warhead supply depleting, the US has a second huge problem: developing a way to produce nuclear fuel, probably mostly from spent fuel, with the desired high concentration of uranium-235. Today, Russia is the primary supplier of enriched uranium.

The plan of the US is to use government research grants to kickstart work on new small modular nuclear reactors that will be more efficient than current nuclear plants. These reactors will use a new fuel with a higher concentration of uranium-235 than is available today, except through purchase from Russia. Grants are also being given to start work on US production of the more highly enriched uranium fuel within the US. It is hoped that most of this highly enriched uranium can come from recycling spent nuclear fuel, thus helping to solve the problem of what to do with the supply of spent fuel.

My analysis indicates that while advanced modular nuclear reactors might theoretically be helpful for the very long term, they cannot fix the problems of the US, and other countries in the West, nearly quickly enough. I expect that the Trump administration, which will start in January 2025, will see this program as a boondoggle.

[1] Current problems with nuclear electricity generation are surprisingly hidden. World electricity generation from nuclear has been close to flat since 2004.

Although there was a dip in world generation of nuclear electricity after the tsunami that affected nuclear reactors in Fukushima, Japan, in 2011, otherwise world production of nuclear electricity has been nearly flat since 2004 (Figure 3).

US nuclear electricity production (Figure 4) shows a similar pattern, except that production since 2021 is down.

[2] The total amount of electricity generated by nuclear power plants is limited by the amount of uranium fuel available to them.

I believe that a major reason why the electricity supply from nuclear has been quite flat since 2004 is because total nuclear electricity generation is limited by the quantity of uranium fuel that is available for the nuclear reactors that have been built.

The price of uranium can perhaps rise, but this doesn’t necessarily add much (or any) supply very quickly. It takes several years to develop a new uranium mine.

In theory, reprocessing of spent fuel to produce uranium and plutonium is also possible, but the amount of that has been performed to date is small. (See Section [6].)

[3] The World Nuclear Association (WNA) published Figure 5 that hints at the world’s uranium supply problem:

The black line showing “reactor requirements” (Figure 5) is in some sense comparable to world generation of nuclear electricity (Figure 3). Both figures show fairly flat lines since about 2004. This relationship hints that there has not been a significant improvement in the efficiency of electricity generation using uranium fuel in the past 20 years.

Figure 5 shows a huge gap between the production of uranium from the various countries and “reactor requirements.” The single largest source of additional supply has been down-blended uranium from nuclear bombs. The EIA reports that the US purchased a large number of nuclear warheads from Russia between 1995 and 2013 for this purpose under the Megatons to Megawatts program. The EIA also reports that for the period 2013 to 2022, a purchase agreement was put in place allowing the US to purchase commercial origin low-enriched uranium from Russia to replace some of down-blended nuclear warhead material. In addition, the US had some of its own nuclear warheads that it could blend down. It was the availability of uranium supply from these various sources that allowed US nuclear electricity generation to remain relatively flat in the 2004 to 2023 period, as shown on Figure 4.

The US’s own uranium extraction reached a peak about 1980 and is now close to zero (Figure 1). The world’s supply of warheads is now over 85% depleted, leaving very little stored-away, highly enriched uranium to blend down (Figure 2)

A hidden problem is the fact that uranium production available today is largely from Russia and its close affiliates. The data underlying Figure 5 shows that uranium production in 2022 is dominated by close allies of Russia (55% of the total coming from Kazakhstan (43% of total), Uzbekistan (7% of total), and Russia (5% of total)). The US (at almost 0%), plus production of its close affiliates, Canada and Australia, provided only 24% of world uranium. This imbalance between Russia and its affiliates, and the US and its affiliates, should be of concern.

[4] The current conflict between the US and Russia adds to nuclear problems.

The US is trying to impose sanctions on Russia. The EIA reports:

“The origin of uranium used in U.S. reactors will likely change in the coming years. In May [2024], the United States banned imports of uranium products from Russia beginning in August [2024], although companies may apply for waivers through January 1, 2028.”

This seems to imply that a transition away from Russian uranium dependence must be made in only a little over three years. This is a short time frame, given the difficulty in making such a transition.

EIA data show that in the year 2023, the US sourced only 4.6% of uranium supplies from the US. (This could be partly or mostly down-blended nuclear warheads). Material purchased from Russia comprised 11.7% of uranium. Kazakhstan provided 20.6% of uranium purchased, and Uzbekistan provided 9.5%. Among US allies, Canada provided 14.9%, and Australia 9.2%.

[5] The WNA does not hint at any uranium supply problems.

The WNA is an advocate for nuclear energy; it cannot suggest that there is any problem with uranium supplies. WNA has the opinion that if there is a shortage of uranium, prices will rise, and more will become available. But even if prices rise, it takes several years to bring new mines into operation. Prices need to stay high, or companies will not pursue what appear to be opportunities.

Readers of OurFiniteWorld.com have seen that oil prices tend to spike and collapse. They don’t stay high for very long because if prices stay high, the end products made with oil tend to become unaffordable. I expect a similar problem occurs with uranium.

The necessary price threshold for high uranium extraction that is mentioned by the WNA is $130/kg in 2021. By coincidence, when a translation is made to dollars per pound using 2024$, this corresponds quite closely to the current price line on Figure 6. Indeed, prices do sometimes bounce high. The problem is getting them to stay as high as the dotted line for long enough to support the multi-decade life of a mine. Economists were forecasting a price of $300 per barrel oil a few years ago, but they have been disappointed. The price is under $75 per barrel now.

The country with the most potentially recoverable uranium is Australia. It produced only 9% of the world’s uranium in 2022, but is reported to have 28% of the world’s remaining reserve. Consistently higher prices would be needed for Australia to start opening new mines.

It is also possible that more uranium supply might become available if improved extraction techniques are developed.

The world seems to be past peak crude oil. By itself, the peak oil issue could limit new uranium extraction and transport.

[6] Recycling of spent fuel to recover usable uranium and plutonium has been accomplished only to a limited extent. Experience to date suggests that recycling has many issues.

It is possible to make an estimate of the amount of recycling of spent fuel that is currently being performed. Figure 3 in Section [1] shows about 65,000 metric tons of uranium are required to meet the demands of existing nuclear power generation, and that as of 2022, there was about an annual shortfall in supply of about 26%. Based on what information I have been able to gather, existing recycling of uranium and plutonium amounts to perhaps 6% of the overall fuel requirement. Thus, as of 2022, today’s recycling of spent fuel could perhaps shave this shortfall in uranium supply to “only” 20% of annual nuclear fuel requirements. There is some recycling of spent fuel, but it is small in relation to the amount needed.

There seem to be several issues with building units to recover uranium from spent fuel:

1. Higher cost than simply mining more uranium
2. Pollution problems from the recycling plants
3. Potential for use of the output to make nuclear warheads
4. Potential for nuclear accidents within the plants
5. Remaining radioactivity at the site at the end of the reprocessing plant’s life, and thus the need to decommission such plants
6. Potential for many protestors disrupting construction and operation because of issues (2), (3), (4), and (5)

The US outlawed recycling of spent fuel in 1977, after a few not-very-successful attempts. Once the purchase of Russian warheads was arranged, down-blending of warheads was a much less expensive approach than reprocessing spent fuel. Physics Today recently reported the following regarding US reprocessing:

“A plant in West Valley, New York, reprocessed spent fuel for six years before closing in 1972. Looking to expand the plant, the owners balked at the costs required for upgrades needed to meet new regulatory standards. Construction of a reprocessing plant in Barnwell, South Carolina, was halted in 1977 following the Carter administration’s ban.”

Japan has been trying to build a commercial spent fuel reprocessing plant at Rokkasho since 1993, but it has had huge problems with cost overruns and protests by many groups. The latest estimate of when the plant will actually be completed is fiscal year 2026 or 2027. The plant would process 800 metric tons of fuel per year.

The largest commercial spent fuel reprocessing plant in operation is in La Hague, France. It has been in place long enough (since 1966) that it has run into the issue of decommissioning an old unit, which was started as a French military project. The first processing unit was shut down in 2003. The International Atomic Energy Administration says, “The UP2-400 decommissioning project began some 20 years ago and may be expected to continue for several more years.” It talks about the huge cost and number of people involved. It says, “Decommissioning activities represent roughly 20 per cent of the overall activity and socio-economic impact of the La Hague site, which also hosts two operating spent fuel recycling plants.”

The cost of the La Hague reprocessing units is probably not fully known. They were built by government agencies. They have gone through various owners including AREVA. AREVA has had huge financial problems. The successor company is Orano. The currently operating units have the capacity to process about 1,700 metric tons of fuel per year. The 1700 metric tons of reprocessing of spent fuel from La Hague is reported to be nearly half of the world’s operating capacity for recycling spent fuel.

I understand that Russia is working on approaches that quite possibly are not included in my figures. If so, this may add to world uranium supply, but Russia is not likely to want to share the benefits with the West if there is not enough to go around.

[7] The concentration of the isotope uranium-235 is very important in making fuel for the proposed new modular nuclear reactors.

Uranium-235 makes up 0.72% of natural uranium. Wikipedia says, “Unlike the predominant isotope uranium-238, it [uranium-235] is fissile, i. e., it can sustain a nuclear reaction.” In most reactors used today, the concentration of uranium-235 is 3% to 5%.

According to CNN, the plan in building advanced modular small reactors is to use fuel with a 5% to 20% concentration of uranium-235. Fuel at this concentration is called high assay low-enriched uranium, or HALEU. The expectation is that power plants with this type of fuel will be more efficient to operate.

Producing higher concentrations of uranium-235 tends to be problematic unless nuclear weapons are available for down-blending; warheads use high concentrations of uranium-235. Now, with reduced availability of nuclear warheads for down-blending, other sources are needed in addition. CNN reports that the only commercial source of HALEU is Russia. The EIA reports that the Inflation Reduction Act invested $700 million to support the development of a domestic supply chain for HALEU.

[8] The US is trying to implement many new ideas at one time with virtually no successful working models to smooth the transition.

Strangely enough, the US has no working model of a small-scale nuclear reactor, even one operating on conventional fuel. A CNBC article from September 2024 says, Small nuclear reactors could power the world, the challenge is building the first one in the US.

The new small-scale nuclear projects we do have are still at a very preliminary stage. In June 2024, Bill Gates wrote, “We just broke ground on America’s first next-gen nuclear facility. Kemmerer, Wyoming will soon be home to the most advanced nuclear facility in the world.” The plan is for it is to become operational by 2030, if it has access to HALEU fuel.

With respect to how far along the ability to make HALEU from spent fuel is, an October 2024 article in Interesting Engineering says, “US approves new facility design concept to turn nuclear waste into reactor fuel:”

“The facility whose conceptual design has been approved will be located at Idaho National Laboratory (INL). It will help turn used material recovered from DOE’s former Experimental Breeder Reactor-II (EBR-II reactor) into usable fuel for its advanced nuclear power plant. . . The plan is to recover approximately 10 metric tons of HALEU from EBR-II fuel by December 2028 using an electrochemical process that was perfected over the years at Idaho National Laboratory (INL).”

Assuming this can be done, it will be a step forward, but it is nowhere near being an at-scale, commercial project that can be done economically by other companies. The volume of 10 metric tons is tiny.

Starting at this level, it is difficult to see how reactors with the new technology and the HALEU fuel to feed them can possibly be available in quantity before 2050.

[9] It is difficult to see how the cost of electricity generated using the new advanced modular nuclear reactors and the new HALEU fuel, created by reprocessing spent fuel, could be low.

As far as I can see, the main argument that these new modular electricity generation plants will be affordable is that they will only generate a relatively small amount of electricity at once —about 300 megawatts or less, or about one third of the average of conventional nuclear reactors in the US. Because of the smaller electricity output, the hope is that they will be affordable by more buyers, such as utility companies.

The issue that is often overlooked by economists is that electricity generated using these new techniques needs to be low cost, per kilowatt-hour, to be helpful. High-cost electricity is not affordable. Keeping costs down when many new approaches are being tried for the first time is likely to be a huge hurdle. I look through the long list of problems encountered in recycling spent fuel mentioned in Section [6] and wonder whether these issues can be inexpensively worked around. There are also issues with adopting and installing the proposed new advanced modular reactors, such as security, that I have not even tried to address.

The hope is that somehow, the whole process of building the advanced modular nuclear reactors and creating the HALEU fuel can be standardized and can be organized in such a way that economies of scale will set in. It seems to me that reaching this goal will be difficult. In theory, perhaps such a goal can be reached in 2060 or 2070, but this is not nearly soon enough, given the world’s current shortage of uranium from mines.

[10] The Trump administration will likely drop or substantially change the current program for advanced modular nuclear reactors.

The US plan that is discussed in this post has been developed under the Biden administration. This group was voted out of power on November 5. The Democratic administration will be replaced by a new Republican administration, headed by Donald Trump, on January 20, 2025.

I would not be surprised if the advanced modular nuclear generation plan disappears, almost as quickly as the currently subsidized offshore wind program, which Trump has vowed to end. The two programs have many things in common: Both programs provide an excuse for more US debt; they provide many jobs for researchers; and the devices that they relate to can be purchased in fairly small increments. But the cost per kilowatt-hour of electricity is likely to be high with either program. In some sense, as they are currently envisioned, they will not efficient ways to produce electricity. A major problem is the lack of fuel for the new modular reactors, and the slow ramp-up time to obtain this fuel.

I expect that under Trump, the sanction against purchasing HALEU from Russia might be replaced with a tariff. That way the US could have the benefit of HALEU, purchased from Russia, but at a higher price. This would allow research to continue, if desired.

[11] If solutions cannot be found, electricity generation from nuclear is likely to gradually disappear.

Over time, the world’s self-organizing economy tends to eliminate its more inefficient parts. When I look at the past experience with nuclear, what I see seems to be another example of the self-organizing economy squeezing out the inefficient parts of the economy (Figure 8):

In this chart, “Advanced Economies, ex US” are defined as members of the Organization for Economic Development (OECD), excluding the US. “Later Entrants” are non-OECD members, excluding Russia and Ukraine. They include China, India, Indonesia, and many other lower-income countries. Many of these countries are in East Asia.

What I see is that the relatively “flat” overall nuclear electricity production has been accomplished, to a significant extent, by the “Advanced Economies, ex US” dropping back in their use of nuclear electricity at close to the same time the “Later Entrants” have rapidly been increasing their use of nuclear electricity. The Later Entrants can make goods for sale in international markets much more cheaply than the Advanced Economies, ex US through their efficient use of cheap energy (often from coal) and their lower wages. This more efficient approach gives the Later Entrants an “edge” in buying the uranium that is available.

I expect to see more of this pattern of squeezing out in the future. In fact, new and recently re-opened nuclear plants will need to compete existing nuclear generation units for available uranium.

Given the way squeezing out takes place, very few people will realize that there is a problem with uranium fuel. It will just be that leaders of some parts of the world, as well as some parts of the US, will start emphasizing stories about how dangerous nuclear energy is. Instead of nuclear, they will emphasize electricity generation from wind and solar and allow these approaches to “go first” when they are available. The result will be wholesale electricity prices that will be far too low for nuclear power plants, much of the time. It will be these low wholesale electricity prices that push nuclear power out.

Thus, unless there truly are breakthroughs in recycling spent fuels, or in uranium mining, electricity generation using nuclear energy may gradually slip away from many parts of the world currently using it.

Source: https://ourfiniteworld.com/2024/11/11/nuclear-electricity-generation-has-hidden-problems-dont-expect-advanced-modular-units-to-solve-them/